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A HICCUP IN FEDERAL COMMON LAW JURISPRUDENCE:
SOSA, BESTFOODS AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
RESTRAINTS ON DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL RULES OF
CORPORATE LIABILITY
RODNEY B. GRIFFITH* AND THOMAS M. GOUTMAN*
Abstract
Since Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,' the Supreme Court has time
and again limited the federal courts' use of federal common law. In a
diversion from that effort, a divided Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain2 that federal courts have limited authority to develop federal
common law based upon the law of nations. Despite the Sosa decision, there
are separation of power, federalism, and institutional concerns that lead the
Supreme Court to limit use of federal common law. However, the Court's
efforts have been contravened by the Courts of Appeals, which have
embraced the notion of federal common law.
Under the Supreme Court's decisions, the presumption is that state law
should be used to fill the interstices of the Bankruptcy Code, the federal
Superfund Act (also known as CERCLA) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
and other federal statutes. Thus, parties and courts err when they assume
that distinct federal common law should be used to decide issues such as
corporate liability under CERCLA and Title VII. Instead, state law should
be used absent a statutory directive, clearly contrary legislative history, or
conflict between a distinct statutory policy and state law. A perceived need
for "uniformity" does notjustify use of distinct federal common law such as
the substantial continuity test of successor liability.
* Rodney B. Griffith is an environmental law attorney in Philadelphia, PA.
**~ Thomas M. Goutman is a partner ofWhite and Williams, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, and chair of
the firm's Litigation Department and Toxic Torts and Environmental Law Group.
1 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
2 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court has endeavored not only
to limit development of federal common law but also lower federal courts'
use of common law analysis.3 In a diversion from those efforts, a divided
Supreme Court held at the end of the 2003 Term in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain'
that the Alien Torts Statute ("ATS") gives federal courts jurisdiction over
civil actions by aliens for violations of international law and, more
significantly, that federal courts have a limited authority to develop federal
common law based upon international law.'
The decision is especially significant because in a series of cases during
the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has limited development of
federal common law unanimously and actively, reviewing Courts of Appeals
decisions when there was no intercircuit conflict over the use of federal
common law. However, the decision in Sosa does not give federal courts free
reign to develop federal common law and use common law analysis. To the
contrary, the Court's decision admonishes federal courts to be very cautious
about recognizing new federal common law causes of action based upon the
law of nations.6 That admonition is consistent with Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court and Justice Scalia have been critical of the
lower courts' 7 willingness to develop federal common law rules.8
Justice Scalia, who the late ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined in a concurring opinion, clearly has no faith that lower federal courts
3 For the purposes of this article, "common law analysis" means (i) analogy (i.e., the borrowing
of decisional rules from related areas of law to decide the same legal issue); (ii) adoption of decisional rules
based upon a determination that they are consistent with federal or statutory policies; or (iii) the
consideration or weighing of conflicting policies to determine the appropriate decisional rule to be
applied.
4 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
I d. at 2754-55,2757-66.
6 Id. at 2765-69.
For the purposes of this paper, the term lower courts" refers to the District Courts and Courts
of Appeals.
8 E.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1994).
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will exercise such caution.9 That distrust is understandable because in many
instances the Courts of Appeals have not heeded the Supreme Court's efforts
to limit the development of federal common law and use of common law
analysis. In justice Scalia's view, control of the lower courts and separation
of power concerns justified a bar upon judicial law-making absent the
approval of Congress.
Despite Justice Scalia's critical concurring opinion, the majority's
opinion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and congressional
action. Sosa thus required a balance of separation of power and institutional
concerns. A majority of the Court decided in Sosa that for the moment, the
Court's interest in maintaining existing precedent outweighed other
concerns. However, that view is not likely to prevail for long if the lower
courts disregard the Supreme Court's admonition to exercise restraint when
developing new federal common law causes of action based upon the law of
nations.
Nothing in Sosa undermines the Supreme Court's efforts to limit
development of federal common law in other decisions, including that of
United States v. Besfoods.' ° Therefore, parties and courts would make a
mistake if they viewed Sosa as giving federal courts carte blanche to use
federal common law to fill the interstices of federal statutes. To the contrary,
the Supreme Court is more likely to limit the use of federal common law to
fill the interstices of federal statutes in areas including bankruptcy,
employment, environmental and immigration law.
1I. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAN
The case of Sosa involved a civil lawsuit by Mexican physician Humberto
Alvarez-Machain against the United States, individual Drug Enforcement
Administration agents, and Mexican citizens who at the behest of the DEA
arranged the doctor's kidnapping and transportation to the United States."
The doctor was then tried and acquitted on federal criminal charges
stemming from the torture and murder of a DEA agent in Mexico. 2
The questions before the Court included whether the long-standing
ATS13 provided federal courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over the
9 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2774-76 (Scalia, J. concurring).
10 524 U.S. 66 (1998).
it Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746-47.
12 Id.
13 28 U.S.C. S 1350. The current ATS differs slightly from its original version, which was
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action of Alvarez and whether his complaint, seeking damages for purported
international law violations, should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action. 4 The majority of the Court held that although international law
did not provide the plaintiff-respondent with a cause of action over which a
district court had jurisdiction under the ATS, there might be some federal
common law actions arising from international law, for which the statute
creates jurisdiction. 5
At the outset, it is important to note that the Supreme Court clearly
agreed on a number of issues concerning the development of federal
common law. First, the Court agreed that the ATS gives federal courts
jurisdiction over actions by aliens arising under international law. 6
Secondly, the Court summarily rejected the argument that the ATS granted
federal courts jurisdiction and empowered them to create a body of federal
common law based on international law. 7 The Supreme Court thus
confirmed that in order to find this dual purpose there must be specific
evidence of congressional intent as the Court identified in Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux."'
A. The Majority Opinion of Sosa
The disagreement in Sosa stems, in large part, from differing views
concerning the extent to which separation of power concerns require the
Supreme Court to bar the development of federal common law based upon
the law of nations. According to the majority, when Congress enacted the
ATS it "understood federal courts would recognize private causes of action
for certain torts in violation of the law of nations," and since then nothing
"has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under
the law of nations as an element of common law."' 9 To the contrary, the
majority finds that Congress "has not only expressed no disagreement with
our [assumption], but has responded to its most notable instance by enacting
legislation supplementing thejudicial determination in some detail."
20
enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, S 9(b), 1 Stat. 79; Sosa, 124 S.
Ct. at 2755 n.10.
1 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-55.
is Id. at 2765-69.
16 Id. at 2754-55, 2772 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
17 Id. at 2761.
18 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987).
19 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765.
20 Id. at 2755-59.
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More simply, the Supreme Court's rationale is as follows:
1. At the time of enactment of the ATS, Congress understood that
federal courts would develop common law, based upon the law
of nations, on a limited basis.2 '
2. For more than 200 years since the jurisdictional statute's
enactment the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
assumed the authority to develop common law based upon the
law of nations, but in most cases the courts have declined to
develop such law.22
3. In response to that long-standing assumption, Congress has not
enacted legislation that contradicts the assumption.
23
4. Instead, with the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection
Act and in statements in the Act's legislative history, Congress
has acknowledged to a limited extent that the assumption is
correct.24
In support of its view that Congress "understood" that federal courts would
recognize a limited number of common law actions based on international
law, the majority presents a lengthy discussion of early legislative concerns
about the United States' compliance with the law ofnations. These concerns
led to the Constitutional grant of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls"
25
and the First Congress's enactment of statutes including the ATS.26
The majority's conclusion is that there may exist a small number of
federal common law actions, arising from international law, that courts
recognized at the time of the Alien Tort Statute's enactment in 1789.27 There
also may be federal common law actions, arising from international law, if
the "claim based on the present-day law of nations ... rest[s] on a norm of
international law accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have
recognized."28 The majority held that the physician's action was not within
either category of claims.29
21 Id. at 2762-65.
22 Id. at 2761.
23 Id. at 2763.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2756-57 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. III, S 2).
26 Id. at 2757-58.
V Id. at 2761-62.
28 Id. at 2762-69.
29 Id.
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The rationale of Sosa is similar to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
the line of decisions culminating in United States v. Besfoods.3' The decisions,
including Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,3" Burks v. Lasker,2
and United States v. Texas"3 provide a rule of interpretation for new federal
statutes: "'Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.' In
such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate."34 The presumption
applies if the existing law is state common law, federal maritime law, or
federal common law "[a] lthough a different standard applies when analyzing
the effect of federal legislation on state law."35  The presumption is
overridden only if there is congressional intent to change the existing law or
the existing law conflicts with a statutory policy.
36
In the Besfoods line of decisions and Sosa, the Supreme Court's purpose
is the same. It seeks to establish a balance between legislative and judicial
law-making where there are long-standing decisional rules of law. In both
situations, the Court allows the long-standing decisional rules of law to stand
absent contrary congressional intent or a conflict between judicially-made
law and a statutory policy, where separation of power concerns require the
elected branches of government to prevail.37
There is one important aspect in which the Besfoods line of decisions and
Sosa differ. The Besfoods presumption limits the discretion of federal courts
to make new law. In Sosa, the Supreme Court allows the federal judiciary
continued discretion to make new law while admonishing the lower courts
30 524 U.S. 60 (1998). Interestingly, Justice Souter is the author of the majority opinion in Sosa
and the unanimous decision in Besr'0ods.
31 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
32 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
3 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
34 Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
3s Id.
36 E.g., id. at 533-37 (1993); Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-
113 (1991).
37 When federal decisional rules of law are at issue and Congress and the judiciary have
concurrent constitutional authority to make law on a subject, the Supreme Court has deferred to
Congress and viewed a statute on the subject as abrogating decisional rules. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981). When a long-standing federal decisional rule of law addresses an issue, on which
Congress has been silent, those rules remain in place absent clear congressional intent to override the rule
or a conflict between the rule and statutory policy. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 533-37; Solimino, 501
U.S. at 108-12. When state rules of law are at issue, separation of power and federalism concerns lead the
Supreme Court to require clear congressional intent to override the state law or a conflict with the federal
statute or a statutory policy. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218-27 (1997); O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,85-89 (1994).
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to use that discretion in a very limited fashion. This difference appears to be
the cause ofJustice Scalia's disagreement with the majority.
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion in Sosa
In Justice Scalia's view, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins3 8 and other Supreme
Court decisions, including Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radclff Materials, Inc.39 and
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,' preclude federal courts from
determining, as a matter of discretion, if norms of international law give rise
to federal common law actions. 4' According to Scalia, in order to determine
the existence of federal common law there must be a source that authorizes
a federal court to do SO, 42 and the ATS does not supply that authorization.
In light ofErie, he is unwilling to find that the federal judiciary's assumption
of authority for more than 200 years, coupled with the lack of any
congressional response to that assumption, justifies the federal courts'
continued assumption of authority. 43 Finally, he agrees with the majority
that there are prudential reasons why federal courts should hesitate to
develop such federal common law." Therefore, he concludes that federal
courts should not develop federal common law in the area without explicit
authorization from Congress.45
Justice Scalia's reliance upon Erie is questionable. As the majority points
out in response to the concurring opinion: "Erie did not in terms bar any
judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the
circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves
in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law
way.
"46
Instead, the Supreme Court's division appears to turn on a disagreement
on one issue: Whether federal courts should exercise discretion to develop
federal common law, based on international law, without explicit
Congressional authorization? Justice Scalia's answer is a clear no. In part,
his negative response arises from his concern that judicial law-making will
lead inevitably to conflict with the elected branches of government
38 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
39 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
40 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
41 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2770-72 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring).
42 Id. at 2772 (Scalia, J. concurring).
43 Id. at 2773-74 (Scalia, J. concurring).
44 Id. at 2774 (Scalia, J. concurring).
45 Id.
4 Id. at 2764.
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responsible for the nation's foreign relations.4 7 Furthermore, his negative
response stems from his distrust of the federal courts to exercise discretion
appropriately. In Justice Scalia's own words:
We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us.
We elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which
must enact the new law and present it for the approval of a President,
whom we also elect. For over two decades now, unelected federal
judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what
they regard as norms of international law into American law.
Today's opinion approves that process in principle, though urging
the lower courts to be more restrained.
This Court seems incapable of admitting that some matters-any
matters-are none of its business. In today's latest victory for its
Never Say Never Jurisprudence, the Court ignores its own
conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags a finger at
the lower courts for going too far, and then-repeating the same
formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used-invites
them to try again.
It would be bad enough if there were some assurance that future
conversions of perceived international norms into American law
would be approved by this Court itself. (Though we know ourselves
to be eminently reasonable, self-awareness of eminent
reasonableness is not really a substitute for democratic election.) But
in this illegitimate lawmaking endeavor, the lower federal courts will
be the principal actors; we review but a tiny fraction of their
decisions. And no one thinks that all of them are eminently
reasonable.
48
In arguing for denial of discretion to lower federal courts, Justice Scalia
relies heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Industries, Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc." and to a lesser extent upon Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers.5° Those decisions, and other efforts by the Supreme Court
7 Id. at 2774-75 (Scalia, J. concurring).
48 Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 2771 (ScaliaJ. concurring), discussing Texas Industries, Inc. v. RadcliffMaterials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981).
so Id. (Scalia, J. concurring), discussing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.
77(1981).
368 UNIVERSI7Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:359
to limit development of federal common law and use of common law
analysis, explain Justice Scalia's unwillingness to allow lower federal courts
discretion. Those efforts also show that the Supreme Court is likely (i) to
eliminate the discretion given lower federal courts by Sosa if they do not
apply Sosa narrowly and (ii) to continue limiting, in other areas of law,
development of federal common law and use of common law analysis.
Therefore, the Supreme Court is likely to visit these issues again when lower
courts use common law analysis and establish rules of federal common law.
1M[. THE SUPREME COURT'S EFFORTS TO LIMrT FEDERAL COURTS'
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW.
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,;" the Supreme Court recognized
that federal courts have the authority to develop uniform federal common
law in order to protect important federal interests.5 2 The Supreme Court
found that the need for uniformity required a federal common law rule,
rather than Pennsylvania law, to determine if the United States gave
untimely notice of forgery of endorsement on a government check, which
would bar the bank's liability as a guarantor of the endorsement.53 U.S.
Treasury regulations required a bank to guarantee prior endorsements on a
government check and governed its liability for a forged endorsement. 4 The
Court, with little discussion, concluded that important federal interests had
to be protected with uniform federal common law:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast
scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will
commonly occur in several states. The application of state law, even
without the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the
rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It
would lead to great diversity in results by making identical
transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states.
The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.
55
Subsequently, the Supreme Court created the possibility ofwide-ranging
development of federal common law with Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
51 51 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 366-69.
54 Id. at 365, 366, nn.1, 2.
55 Id. at 367.
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Mills.s6 There the Court found that by adopting Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), Congress authorized federal courts
to develop uniform federal common law for application in LMRA actions.5 7
According to the Court, the "policies of our national labor laws" would guide
the federal courts in developing that common law."
A. The Limits of Lincoln Mills as a Basis For Establishing Federal Common
Law Beyond LMRA.
In light of Clearfield Trust, the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills
appears at first to be an anomaly. The Court in Clear teld Trust declared that
federal courts may fashion federal common law to protect federal interests.
Why did the Supreme Court have to find in Section 301 of the LMRA a grant
of power to develop a federal common law for the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements? 9 Two intervening Supreme Court decisions
indicate the answer. The first decision, United States v. Standard Oil Co.6w
came only four years after Clearfield Trust and ten years before Lincoln Mills.
The Supreme Court decided the second case, Bank ofAmerica v. Parnell,6 only
one year before Lincoln Mills. Together, they raised serious doubts about the
broad application of the Cleartfeld Trust Doctrine, particularly in cases such
as Lincoln Mills in which the United States was not a party.62
Nonetheless, there was good reason to find that federal courts could
develop federal common law in order to interpret collective bargaining
agreements. Congress recognized in the LMRA's legislative history that state
law rules could inhibit enforcement of the agreements against unions, which
would not promote industrial peace.' Arguably, there was some evidence of
congressional intent to override contrary state law in order to further federal
labor law policy.' 4 Furthermore, Congress, the Supreme Court, or both had
56 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
57 Id. at 450-56.
% Id. at 456.
59 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51, nn.1-2 (1957) (noting intercircuit conflict and listing
cases).
6 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
61 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
6 For a discussion of Standard Oil and Parnell, see text, infia at nn. 99-104. In this article, I count
as "Cleatfield Trust Doctrine" decisions only those Supreme Court decisions where the majority opinion
considers, (i) whether to develop federal common law in reliance upon Clearfield Trust, without identifying
any other basis for developing federal common law, and (ii) displaceing state law with federal common
law because of the existence of "federal interests."
W' Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452-54.
64 Id. at 454-55.
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reason to view state law interference as a very real threat because in a seminal
federal labor law case the union invoked state law in an unsuccessful attempt
to evade review by the Supreme Court.' The result was the Supreme
Court's finding in Section 301 a grant of power to make federal common law
based upon federal labor law policies.
The Supreme Court has not turned from the course taken in Lincoln
Mills." The Court even developed a body of law concerning the LMRA's
preemption of state law,67 and held that the LMRA preempted an injured
union member's negligence action for personal injury against a union to the
extent the claims required interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.68 If a state official enforces a state policy and denies a bargaining
unit member a state benefit because of her right under a collective bargaining
agreement to arbitrate grievances, the state action may be preempted by
LMRA and the official's action may give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.69
At the same time, the Supreme Court's finding that LMRA Section 301
provided federal courts with the power to create federal common law and
decisions subsequent to Lincoln Mills make it difficult to find authority to
create a body of federal common law in other federal statutes. As to the
LMRA, the Supreme Court identified a specific Congressional policy that
explained the need for federal courts to develop federal common law for the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.70 On the other hand, the
65 In Steele v. Louisville & N. RR, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a seminal case in which a bargaining unit
member brought action for breach of duty of fair representation involving racial discrimination pursuant
to the Railway Labor Act. The union argued that state courts granted demurrer on state law grounds,
including that an Alabama statute barred suit against a union, an unincorporated association, unless all
members were liable individually. Id. at 197 n.I.
66 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (considering when acquisition of
employer's assets results in the acquirer having obligations under a collective bargaining agreement of the
employer); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (same);
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (finding in LMRA duty of fair representation that gave union member
private action against employer and union for mishandling grievance); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151 (1983) (finding that federal statute of limitations was consistent with the policies of federal labor law,
rather than state limitations statutes and should be applied in private duty of fair representation actions).
67 E.g., Allis Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399 (1988).
68 Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
6 Livadis v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
70 Id. at 122 (Section 301 "authorize[s] the development of federal common-law rules of decision
in large part to assure that agreements to arbitrate grievances would be enforced, regardless of the vagaries
of state law and lingering hostility toward extrajudicial dispute resolution.").
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Court found that other federal statutes did not grant judicial authority to
create federal common law.7'
Since the Lincoln Mills decision, the Supreme Court has found a
congressional grant ofjudicial power to develop a body of federal common
law in only one federal statute, the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA").72 That finding is based upon statements in ERISA's
legislative history that courts should develop federal rules to govern in suits
by pension plan beneficiaries and participants and that specifically refer to
federal courts' power under LMRA Section 301. 73
B. Supreme Court Limits on Clearfield Trust: The First 35 Years
From the time of deciding Clearfield Trust through the 1977 Term, the
Supreme Court labored to determine when it was appropriate to develop
federal common law, rather than apply state law, in cases not involving the
LMRA. During that time, in cases involving aWar Department procurement
contract,74 libel actions against federal officials, 75 and in United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co. ,76 the Supreme Court referred to Clearfield Trust and
found that federal common law should be applied to protect federal interests
not involving the LMRA. During the final 22 years of that 35-year period,
the Supreme Court clearly invoked the Clearfield Trust Doctrine and
developed federal common law on only one occasion after 1950.
7 7
71 See Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1965) (no provision of Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 supported finding that Court should develop federal common law to decide dispute
among private parties dealing in the leases.); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963) (statute
governing issuance of congressional subpoenas, and violation of that statute, did not result in private
action "arising" under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and distinguishing Lincoln Mills.).
7 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-56 (1987).
73 Id. at 55-56.
74 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). In Nat'l Metro. Bank v. United States,
323 U.S. 454, (1945), the Supreme Court followed, but did not extend, Clearfield Trust where the Court
used federal common law to decide the liability of a bank which had accepted checks forged by a
Government clerk. The late Hon. Henry Friendly considered two other Government contract cases
decided by the Supreme Court after Clearfield Trust to be Clearfield Trust Doctrine cases. Henry Friendly,
In Praise of Erie -And of the New Federal Common Law, in BENCHMARKS 155, 182 (1967). However, in the
Supreme Court decisions, the majority opinions do not cite Clearfield Trust and rely respectively on pre-
Erie federal general law decisions and federal regulations as the basis for their conclusions. Priebe & Sons,
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 410-12 (1947); Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383-86
(1947). Therefore, it does not appear accurate to characterize the Supreme Court decisions as prodigy
of Cleatfield Trust.
75 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
76 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
'n Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). I count the
decisions in Barr and Howard as one occasion because they involve the same issue and the Supreme Court
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Although the Supreme Court cited Cleafield Trust in Banco Nacional v.
Sabbatino,7 it cannot be considered a Clea field Trust Doctrine decision. In
Sabbatino the Court held that despite Erie the Act of State doctrine was a
federal and not a state law issue.79 The Court applied the doctrine to find
that federal courts, in a diversity matter, could not review the propriety of the
Cuban government's expropriation of property within its territory and
pursuant to Cuban law.' ° In finding that the Act of State doctrine was federal
law, the Court relied in part upon constitutional and statutory provisions
indicating an intent "to give matters of international significance to the
jurisdiction of federal institutions."8' In light of this reliance upon
constitutional and statutory provisions and its declining to review a foreign
government's expropriation ofproperty within its own territory, the decision
in Sabbatino may be characterized best as a case of federal preemption and of
declining to address a "political question."8
2
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,s3 the Supreme Court recognized federal
courts' authority to make "federal common law" in order "to appraise the
equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution"
in a suit by Illinois against a number of Wisconsin municipalities over their
pollution of Lake Michigan.84 The Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee relied
upon Supreme Court decisions in lawsuits by States to halt water pollution
by other States or municipalities in other States.85 In actions by States, the
Constitution's grant ofjudicial power to federal courts over such actions and
the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court gave the federal
called them "companion case[s]." Lyons, 360 U.S. at 594 (1959).
78 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964).
79 Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 424-27. The Act of State doctrine, a common law rule developed
by English courts and adopted by U.S.jurisdictions, bars a court from reviewing the activities of a foreign
government within its own territory. Id. at 416-20. In such instances, a party must obtain redress by
seeking diplomatic action by the United States. Id.
So Id. at 401-08, 438-39.
st Id. at 427 n.25. In Sabbatino, the Court did not decide whether federal question jurisdiction
existed. Id. at 398 n.20.
82 Id. at 427-37. The historical context of Sabbatino supports the characterization of the decision
as a case of preemption and deference to the legislature and executive on a "political question." The
Supreme Court decided Sabbatino less than three years after the Bay of Pigs invasion, approximately two
years after the Cuban trade embargo began, and seventeen months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. JANE
FRANKLIN, CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY (1997).
83 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
84 Id. at 93, 107.
ss Id. at 94-96, 106-07, citing NewJersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208
(1900). In several of those cases the Supreme Court declined to enjoin water pollution. New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. at 312-13; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 526.
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judiciary authority to develop federal common law that governs the States'
disputes.8 6 However, the federal courts' authority to develop federal
common law in such State actions ended upon Congress exercising its
constitutional power and enacting statutory law to displace that common
law.'7 Therefore, the Court's rationale for finding authority to create federal
common law in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee is distinct from the bases in
Cleafield Trust and Lincoln Mills.
In short, during the first thirty-five years after deciding Cleafield Trust,
the Supreme Court recognized the need for federal common law in only
three or four instances that did not involve a specific constitutional or
congressional grant of judicial power to make common law. In the same
period, the Supreme Court rejected at least eight pleas in which Clear ield
Trust was invoked for the establishment of federal common law to protect
purported federal interests. In those cases, the Supreme Court either
deferred to Congress or held that state law should govern the dispute.
1. LITTLE LAKE MISERE LAND Co. AND THE USE OF THE CLFARFELD
TRUST DOCTRINE.
To appreciate the Supreme Court's use and limits upon the Cleafield
Trust Doctrine, it is crucial to understand the facts of United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co.88 There, the Louisiana legislature enacted a statute that
attempted to free from prescription the mineral rights of parties in property
acquired by the United States pursuant to the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act. 9 Under the terms of the United States' acquisition of the property, the
parties' mineral rights expired upon failure to develop the rights during a ten-
year period.9° However, the state statute made mineral rights in property
acquired by the United States not subject to prescription. 91
In Little Lake Misere Land Co., there was clear and egregious overreaching
by the Louisiana legislature in conflict with federal interests. The legislature
attempted to nullify the property rights of the United States. The decisions
U.S. CONST. art III; Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105-07.
87 Milwaukeev. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,316-19 (1981) (holdingthat the Clean WaterAct displaced
federal courts' power to determine under federal common law whether Illinois should be granted
injunction against Wisconsin municipalities for public nuisance because of pollution of Lake Michigan);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560-62, 564-66 (1963) (finding that the Project Act, not federal
common law of equitable apportionment, governed parties' rights to Colorado River water).
88 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
89 Id. at 596-98.
90 Id. at 582-83.
91 Id. at 584.
374 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:359
in Clearfield Trust, Barr v. Matteo,92 Howard v. Lyons,93 United States v. Allegheny
County94 and Little Lake Misere Land Co. thus all have an important feature in
common.
In Little Lake Misere Land Co., state law threatened to interfere with the
federal government's use of its property in that the state law attempted either:
(i) to extend private parties' rights to mine or drill for oil or gas on a federal
wildlife refuge, or (ii) to force the federal government to purchase those
extended rights. In the companion cases of Barr and Howard v. Lyons, state
law imposed liability for defamation upon a federal official performing his
job duties.9 In Clearfield Trust state law required the Government to make
payment on fraudulent checks.96 In Allegheny County, state law imposed
liability for state taxes upon the Government for manufacture of war
materials.97 In each case, state law threatened to directly increase the
Government's cost of performing basic activities including acquisition and
management of real property, purchasing of materials, and disbursal of funds.
The Supreme Court has always recognized that the federal judiciary has the
authority to prevent such state interference with the federal government.9"
In other Supreme Court cases in which parties attempted unsuccessfully to
invoke the Clearfield Trust Doctrine, state law posed no similar threat to basic
Government activities.
2. SUPREME COURT CASES DECLINING TO EXTEND CLE4RFELD
TRUST.
In United States v. Standard Oil Co.,99 three years after Clearfield Trust, the
Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument for a federal common
law tort action that would allow it to recover reimbursement for medical
expenses incurred to treat a soldier hit by a truck."° The Court recognized
that a clear federal interest existed but left to Congress the decision of
whether to create the cause of action.
92 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
93 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
94 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
9 Barrv. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564,566-68 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593,594-96 (1959).
% Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,364-66 (1943).
97 322 U.S. 174. 178-81 (1944).
98 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The federal judiciary's authority is based upon
the Constitution's Supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 540-41 (2001). In one of the early Clearfield Trust Doctrine cases, the Supreme Court invoked
McCulloch v. Maryland by name. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1944).
99 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
100 Id. at 301.
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[W]e have not here simply a question of creating a new liability in
the nature of a tort .... [T]he issue comes down in final
consequence to a question of federal fiscal policy, coupled with
considerations concerning the need for and the appropriateness of
means to be used in executing the policy ....
Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper
subject for congressional action .... Congress, not this Court or the
other federal courts, is the custodian of the national purse. By the
same token it is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter of
federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend .... securing ... against
financial losses however inflicted ....
Moreover Congress without doubt has been conscious throughout
most of its history that the Government constantly sustains losses
through the tortious ... conduct of persons interfering with federal
funds, property and relationships. We cannot assume that it has been
ignorant that losses long have arisen from injuries inflicted on
soldiers ....
When Congress has thought it necessary to... prevent interference
with federal funds, property or relations, it has taken positive action
to that end. We think it would have done so here, if that had been
its desire.'
Nine years later the Supreme Court held that state law, not federal
common law, should be applied to decide a bank's liability for negotiating
federal bearer bonds stolen from the plaintiffY'O° The Court in Bank of
America v. Parnell noted that the only possible reason for a uniform federal
common law rule would be that "the floating of securities of the United
States might somehow or other be adversely affected by the local rule of a
particular state regarding the liability of a converter," but rejected that
101 Id. at 314-16. Congress eventually adopted a statute that allowed the United States to recover
reimbursement for medical expense incurred to treat active military personnel injured in an accident. E.g.
United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d 1483, 1486-88 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussing the Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 2651-2653, and its history). As originally drafted, the statute would have
given the United States only a right of subrogation, but it was amended to give the United States an
independent action. Trammel, 899 F.2d at 1487. State law, not federal common law, governs the
Government's right to obtain reimbursement. Trammel, 899 F.2d at 1487-88.
' Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956), rev% 226 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1955).
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concern as "far too speculative." 3 It thus found no reason to apply uniform
federal common law "to transactions essentially of local concern.""°4
In United States v. Brosnan,' the Supreme Court held that state law
should be adopted as federal common law in order to determine whether
state proceedings by a mortgage-holder that foreclosed upon default should
extinguish junior federal tax liens, even though the United States neither
participated nor was required to participate. 1 6 The Court found that in that
instance it was more appropriate for Congress to displace state law:
[T]he need for uniformity in this instance is outweighed by the
severe dislocation to local property relationships which would result
from our disregarding state procedures. Long accepted nonjudicial
means of enforcing private liens would be embarrassed, if not
nullified where federal liens are involved, and many titles already
secured by such means would be cast in doubt. We think it more
harmonious with the tenets of our federal system and more
consistent with what Congress has already done in this area, not to
inject ourselves into the network of competing private property
interests, by displacing well-established state procedures governing
their enforcement, or superimposing on them a new federal rule.
It must be recognized that the factors supporting a federal rule of
uniformity in this field, and those militating against the dislocation
of long-standing state procedures, are full of competing
considerations. They involve many imponderables which this Court
is ill-equipped to assess, on which Congress has not yet spoken, and
which we think are best left to that body to deal with in light of their
full illumination. 10 7
Five years after Lincoln Mills, the Court decided the case of Wheeldin v.
Wheeler.08 There, the Court rejected the argument that a federal statute
governing issuance of subpoenas empowered federal courts to create a cause
of action for alleged wrongful issuance and service of a subpoena on behalf
of the House Un-American Activities Committee.' °9 The Court found that
103 Id. at 32.
'0 Id. at 33.
105 105 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
106 Id. at 237.
107 Id. at 251-52.
10 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
109 Id.
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there was no important federal interest implicated such as was the case in
Clearfield Trust." It additionally failed to find any congressional grant of
power to create a cause of action as existed in Lincoln Mills."' The Court
stated, "[a] s respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights,
it is perhaps needless to say that we are not in thefree-wheeling days before Erie R.
Co ..... The instances where we have created federal common law are few and
restricted."112
In United States v. Yazell," 3 the Supreme Court rejected the Small
Business Administration's argument for a federal common law that would
allow the government to enforce ajudgment based upon a failure to repay a
disaster loan against a married borrower's personal property, even though
state covertures law prevented levying upon her property.'14 According to the
Court,
[T] his Court, in the absence of specific congressional action, should
not decree in this situation that implementation of federal interests
requires overriding the particular state rule involved here. Both
theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state
interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property
arrangements. They should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state
interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied.
t 5
The same year that it decided Yazell, the Supreme Court held that no
federal interest required development of federal common law to decide
private parties' rights in a mineral lease issued by the United States pursuant
to the Mineral Leasing Act. 16 According to the Court, state law should be
applied to determine the rights of the private parties.1 7 Furthermore, state
law should decide the respective rights of the United States and other parties
under a mineral lease unless an overriding federal interest existed."8 The
Court also stated that even if a compelling federal interest existed, additional
0to Id. at 651
III Id. at 651-52.
112 Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
113 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 351-52.
116 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
117 Id. at 67-71.
11 Id. at 71-72.
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considerations were necessary to weigh both the impact of federal common
law upon important state interests and the feasibility of developing a uniform
federal rule. 19
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court found in Miree v. DeKalb County"'
that state law should determine whether an agreement between the Federal
Aviation Administration and a county would impose liability on the county
to a deceased passenger, a burn victim, and the aircraft's owner. 121 The
accident occurred when the aircraft struck birds attracted to the county's
landfill adjacent to an airport.12 Following Parnell, the Court found there
was no federal interest sufficient to justify overriding state law."z  The
Clearfield Trust Doctrine did not apply because the Court found "no reason
for concluding that [FAA] operations would be burdened or subjected to
uncertainty by variant state-law interpretations regarding whether those with
whom the United States contracts might be sued by third-party beneficiaries
to the contracts ."124 The Court also stated that while federal interests
concerning aviation regulation and safety were present, federal common law
should not be developed when that law would only advance those federal
interests. According to the Court, "[w] hether latent federal power should be
exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress" and "the
issue of whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily a
decision for Congress."
125
In Standard Oil Co., Brosnan, Yazell, Pan American Petroleum, and DeKalb
County the liability of private parties, not the United States, was the issue. As
such, there was no indication that federal common law was necessary to
protect against state law burdening basic governmental activities. There was
simply no federal interest at stake similar to the interests involved in Clearfield
Trust, Barr, Allegheny County, and Little Lake Misere Land Co. In the absence
of such federal interests, separation of power and federalism concerns drive
the Supreme Court to limit the Clearfield Trust Doctrine. In Standard Oil Co.,
Brosnan, Yazell, Pan American Petroleum, and DeKalb County, the Supreme
Court recognizes that for various reasons the federal judiciary should defer
to Congress to decide whether federal law should be developed in an area.
119 Id. at 68-69 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) and United Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)).
'2 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 27-32.
123 Id. at 31-33.
124 Id. at 30.
125 Id. at 32.
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The Supreme Court's decisions in Standard Oil Co. and its aftermath
illustrate how a more expansive use of the Clearfield Trust Doctrine could
create separation of power problems. In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court
declined to create a federal cause of action allowing the United States to
recover in tort, medical expenses incurred because of the injury of military
personnel.126 Congress eventually recognized the importance of the federal
interest and created a cause of action, but did not act until fourteen years after
the Standard Oil decision.12 However, lack of congressional action for
fourteen years suggests that the federal interest was not important to
Congress. Additionally, congressional action finally occurred only after
Congress weighed whether subrogation to the injured soldier or a direct
action was more appropriate.1 28 More active use of the Clearfield Trust
Doctrine thus could lead to the federal courts setting the congressional
agenda and the scope of its debate, contrary to the Constitution's provisions
that make the federal judiciary a governmental branch of limited power
subject to regulation by Congress."
In the Clearfield Trust Doctrine cases, separation of power issues arose in
another sense. In Standard Oil and Wheeldin respectively, the United States
and a private party invoked the power of the federal courts to create a federal
cause of action. 3 ' In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court declined to act
because the United States sought judicial use of federal power involving the
Government's purse strings, an area where Congress has primary
responsibility and presumably would have created a cause of action to protect
those purse strings if it wished.' 31 In Wheeldin, the Court declined to act
because a private party invoked the Court's use of federal power in an area
where the Court found that Congress had an opportunity to act but did not
do so. 32 The Supreme Court thus declined to use its judicial power where
126 See discussion of Standard Oil, supra at notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
1V 76 Stat. 593 (1962).
128 United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d 1483, 1486-88 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussing the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 2651-53, and its history). In the case of Sabbatino, Congress
took less than seven months to abrogate the Supreme Court's decision. See Foreign Assistance Act S
301 (d)(4), 22 U.S.C. S 2370 (e)(2) (codifying 78 Stat. 1013 (Oct. 7,1964)); Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (March 23, 1964). There, the Supreme Court's hesitation to develop federal common law
set the congressional agenda. However, deference to Congress gave it full control to decide when to
create a federal cause of action and the scope of the action; that would not have occurred in Standard Oil
Co. or Sabbatino if the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action, or if Congress disagreed with the
Court and the legislative branch had to undo the Court's decision.
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, SS 1, 8, art. III, SS 1-2.
130 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,302 (1947); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647,648 (1963).
131 Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 311,314-16.
132 W4heeler, 373 U.S. at 652.
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Congress has primary responsibility, where it may have decided not to
exercise its legislative power, or where conflicting policy considerations made
Congress the appropriate decision maker.
133
In Brosnan and Yazell respectively, the United States and a federal agency
invoked the Clearfield Trust Doctrine in an attempt to override state law.
134
In Parnell, Pan American Petroleum, and DeKalb County, private parties did
likewise. 35 In doing so, the parties sought to use the federal courts, not
Congress, to protect or further purported federal interests. In each case, the
Supreme Court recognized those responsibilities as being entrusted to
Congress and not the federal judiciary.136 In addition, there are federalism
concerns that explain the Supreme Court's limiting the use of the Clearfield
Trust Doctrine in Parnell, Brosnan, Yazell, Pan American Petroleum, and DeKalb
County. In those cases, the United States or private parties sought to invoke
the federal judiciary's power to develop a rule of federal common law
contrary to a state common law rule. 137 Additionally, the United States or
private parties sought to override state law in areas where the law impacted
property ownership and business transactions.13 The Supreme Court
recognized that in the federal system, parties rely upon those state laws to
determine their obligations and rights in property and business transactions,
and the Court was loathe to disturb such state laws.
139
A federalism concern does not appear to be present in Cleafield Trust
because the matter involved a check issued by the Government and the
Treasury Department had promulgated regulations governing negotiation of
Government checks." Banks thus had notice of the federal interest at stake
and of the possibility of federal action to protect that interest. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Cleafield Trust did not change the existing law and
133 Standard Oil Co., 323 U.S. at 310-14. See also United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 509-13
(1954) (conflicting policy considerations made it appropriate for Congress, not the federal courts, to
decide whether the government may assert an indemnity claim against a federal employee whose action
resulted in a Federal Torts Claim Act claim against United States); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S.
237,238-39 (1960); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,342-43 (1966).
134 Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 238-39; Yazell, 382 U.S. at 342-43.
135 Parnell, 352 U.S. at 31-32; Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 65-66 (1965);
Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1977).
136 Miree, 433 U.S. at 31-33; Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. at 68-71; Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352;
Wheeler, 373 U.S. at 650-52; Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 251-52; Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 315-16.
137 Miree, 433 U.S. at 32-33; PanAm. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. at 65-68; Yazell, 382 U.S. at 342-43;
Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 238-40.
138 Miree, 433 U.S. at32-33; PanAm. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. at 65-66; Yazell, 382 U.S. at35O-53;
Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 341-42.
139 Miree, 433 U.S. at 30-33; Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. at 68, 71-72; Yazell, 382 U.S. at
351-53; Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 342.
140 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 365 n.1, 366 n.2 (1943).
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thus did not change bank expectations as to when they would be liable to the
United States for negotiating a Government check with a forged
endorsement. 4 Rather, the Supreme Court continued a line of pre-Erie
cases in which it declined to allow various defenses to bar the United States
from recovering a payment on a check with a forged endorsement.142
Similarly, the Court in United States v. Allegheny County143 invoked
Clearfield Trust to overcome a Pennsylvania law under which a World War II
era defense contractor would have been liable for state taxes on machinery
owned by the United States but in the possession of the contractor.1" The
United States intervened in Allegheny County because, under the terms of the
contract, the United States would have had to reimburse the contractor for
payment of the state taxes. 4 ' The Supreme Court used the Clearteld Trust
Doctrine in Allegheny County only to extend McCullough v. Maryland, one of
the Court's earliest precedent, holding that States may not tax the United
States." 6 Given the fundamental and well-known precedent of McCullough
and long-standing precedent that federal law governed the interpretation of
a contract with the United States,1 47 Allegheny County should not have been
surprised at the result.
3. THE LIMnTs ON CLEARFIELD TRUST: THE DECISIONS AFTER MMREE
v. DFKALB COUNTY.
During the 1978 Term, the Supreme Court decided a set of cases
concerning the use of the Clear'field Trust Doctrine. In each case the Court
determined that state common law, rather than a judicially created federal
common law, was more appropriately applied to the case at hand.
In the case of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,148 the Supreme Court
reviewed decisions in which the Farm Home Administration ("FHA") and
Small Business Administration ("SBA") invoked Clearfield Trust and sought
the creation of federal common law to override state law.149 In the SBA case,
the district court fashioned federal common law based on tax law and found
141 Id. at 365-66.
142 United States v. Nat'l Exch. Bank, 214 U.S. 302 (1909); Nat'l Metro. Bank v. United States,
323 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1945) (discussing Clearfidd Trust and National Exchange Bank).
143 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
14 Id. at 177-82.
145 Id. at 179-80.
14 Id. at 175-77, 182-89, citing McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
147 United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 205 U.S. 105 (1905).
148 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
149 Id. at 718-24.
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that the SBA had a superior lien on a borrower's personal property." The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and applied the Texas Uniform
Commercial Code to find that another secured creditor had a superior lien
to the SBA's lien on the borrower's property."' At trial in the FHA case, the
district court found that under either state law or federal common law, the
Administration did not have a perfected security interest in the tractor of a
bankrupt borrower that was superior to a repairman's lien.'52 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that
under federal common law developed from the Model UCC and Tax Lien
Act, only one of several repair bills created a repairman's lien superior to the
FHA's lien.'53 The Supreme Court held that under Clearfield Trust, federal
rules of law should govern to decide the creditor rights of the FHA and SBA,
which administered national programs pursuant to federal statute."5
Nevertheless, the Court held in both cases that state law, not distinct federal
common law, should be applied to decide the creditor rights of the U.S.
agencies. 155
The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods set forth a multi-factor test to
determine whether the federal judiciary should develop uniform federal
common law or simply utilize existing state law. The factors that the
Supreme Court identified as favoring creation of federal law rules distinct
from state law were: (1) whether a federal program "by [its] nature [is] and
must be uniform in character throughout the Nation," 156 and (2) "[w] hether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs." 157 Additionally, the Court stated that federal courts had to
"consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law."' The Court then
concluded that state law should govern:
We are unpersuaded that, in the circumstances presented here,
nationwide standards favoring claims of the United States are
necessary to ease program administration or to safeguard the Federal
Treasury from defaulting debtors. Because the state commercial
codes "furnish convenient solutions in no way inconsistent with
SO Id. at 720-22.
151 Id. at 722-23.
152 Id. at 724.
153 Id. at 724-25.
15 Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 726-27.
155 Id. at 727-31.
156 Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,354 (1966)).
157 Id.
' Id. at 729.
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adequate protection of the federal interest [s]," we decline to override
intricate state laws of general applicability on which private creditors
base their daily commercial transactions.159
In part, the Supreme Court found no need for uniformity because FHA and
SBA regulations and manuals anticipated the use of state law in order to
perfect liens on personal property. 160
The Kimbell Foods decision, considered together with Cleafield Trust and
Allegheny County, provide a hint as to what constituted "national programs"
for which the federal judiciary would be willing to develop a uniform federal
common law. In Cleafield Trust, the activity was the Government's issuance
and payment of checks, which involved "transactions on a vast scale."
161
Similarly inAllegheny County, the activitywas the Government's procurement
contracts for war materials during World War II; another area involving a
tremendous number of transactions which affected the Government's
liability under an indemnity or reimbursement provision.62 Furthermore,
uniform federal common law was adopted concerning an activity where
parties dealing with the Government had reason to expect federal law would
control."6
Later in the 1978 Term, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribes.' 64 There, the Supreme Court considered in light of Kimbell
Foods whether to apply uniform federal common law rules in a case which
addressed the effect of changes in a stream's location, where it arguably
moved the boundary between two States and involved a dispute over land
that had been part of an Indian reservation."' After a lengthy discussion of
the interpretation and scope of 25 U.S.C. Section 194, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a uniform federal common law rule or state
law should decide the ownership of the land.' 66 The Supreme Court held
that federal law should govern because it involved a dispute over property
that the United States held in trust as a reservation for the Tribes.
67
1s9 Id. (citations omitted).
160 Id. at 729-3 1.
161 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
162 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 177-78, 179 (1944).
163 See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Exch. Bank, 214 U.S. 302, (1909); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel, 205 U.S. 105 (1905). In these pre-Erie decisions the Supreme Court applied uniform federal law
to determine the respective issues of a bank's liability for negotiating a Government check with a forged
endorsement and parties' rights and obligations under a Government contract.
'H 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
165 Id. at 658-63.
166 Id. at 669.
167 Id. at 669-71. The Court rejected the argument that uniform federal common law should be
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Nevertheless, the Court held that in light of Kimbell Foods state law should
be borrowed or adopted as federal law to decide who had the right to possess
the property.
... States may differ among themselves with respect to the rules that
will identify and distinguish between avulsions and accretions, but
as long as the applicable standard is applied, evenhandedly to
particular disputes, we discern no imperative need to develop a
general body of federal common law to decide cases such as this,
where an interstate boundary is not in dispute. We should not accept
"generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence
that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal interests] ."'68
The Court also stated that the third prong of the Kimbell Foods test,
disruption of state law, prompted it to select state law over federal common
law:
[T]he States have substantial interest in having their own law resolve
controversies such as these. Private landowners rely on state real
property law when purchasing real property, whether riparian land
or not. There is considerable merit in not having the reasonable
expectations of these private landowners upset by the vagaries of
being located adjacent to or across from Indian reservations or other
property in which the United States has a substantial interest.
Borrowing state law will also avoid arriving at one answer.., in
disputes involving Indians on one side and possibly quite different
answers with respect to neighboring land where non-Indians are the
disputants. 169
applied because the case involved movement of the Missouri River that changed the boundary between
Nebraska and Iowa. According to the Court, there was no boundary dispute between the States, which
had settled the location of their boundary "on the ground" as the result of a Compact and previous
litigation before the Supreme Court. Id. at 672-74, (citing Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117 (1972)).
However, it held that federal law should govern because the case involved land to which the Omaha
Tribes had "aboriginal title," it never was land of a State subject to its laws, and upon the creation of the
reservation the United States received an interest in the property and held it in trust for the Tribes. Id.
at 669-71.
168 Id. at 673 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 730).
169 Id. at 674.
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The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods and Omaha Indian Tribes made it clear
that the federal judiciary should not adopt federal common law based on
"generalized pleas for uniformity."' 70
In the 1980 Term, the Supreme Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois raised
further doubts about wide-spread use of federal common law by the federal
judiciary. Although the decision involved a federal common law issue other
than the Clearfield Trust Doctrine, the Supreme Court quoted from a myriad
of past decisions to emphasize that federal common law was not favored:
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their
own rules of decision. The enactment of a federal rule in an area of
national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in
doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully
insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their
elected representatives in Congress. Erie recognized as much....
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and
when there exists a "significant conflict between some federal policy
or interest and the use of state law," the Court has found it
necessary, in a "few and restricted" instances, to develop federal
common law. Nothing in this process suggests that courts are better
suited to develop national policy in areas governed by federal
common law than they are in other areas, or that the usual and
important concerns of an appropriate division of functions between
the Congress and the federal judiciary are inapplicable.
171
Nonetheless, federal entities did not turn from their efforts to seek the
development of federal common law that would override state law nor did
federal appellate courts hesitate to appease them. In O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC,'72 a case in which no intercircuit conflict was identified, the Supreme
Court reversed a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in which
that court accepted the FDIC's argument that uniform federal common law
should decide whether knowledge should be imputed to a bank for which
the FDIC was a receiver in a civil action on behalf of the bank.173
In this extraordinary case, the Supreme Court undertook to correct an
appellate decision in favor of a federal entity and summarily rejected the
170 Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 730).
171 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,312-13 (1981) (citinge.g., Erie, Wallis v. PanAm. Petroleum,
Wheedin, and Clearfield Trust).
17 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
173 Id. at 82-89 (1994).
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FDIC's arguments for development of federal common law. As to the
FDIC's evocation of Kimbell Foods and its plea for a uniform federal rule, the
Supreme Court stated:
[T]his is not [a] case[] in which judicial creation of a special federal
rule would be justified. Such cases are, as we have said in the past,
"few and restricted," limited to situations where there is a
"significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
use of state law." Our cases uniformly require the existence of such
a conflict as a precondition for recognition of a federal rule of
decision. Not only the permissibility but also the scope ofjudicial
displacement of state rules turns upon such a conflict. What is fatal
to respondent's position in the present case is that it has identified no
significant conflict with an identifiable federal policy or interest.
There is not even at stake that most generic (and lightly invoked) of
alleged federal interests, the interest in uniformity. The rules of
decision ... here do not govern the primary conduct of the United
States or any of its agents or contractors ....
The closest respondent comes to identifying a specific, concrete
federal policy or interest that is compromised by California law is its
contention that state rules regarding the imputation of knowledge
might "deplet[e] the deposit insurance fund." But neither FIRREA
nor the prior law sets forth any anticipated level for the fund, so what
respondent must mean by "depletion" is simply the forgoing of any
money which, under any conceivable legal rules, might accrue to the
fund. That is a broad principle indeed, which would support...
judicial creation of new, "federal-common-law" causes of action to
enrich the fund. ... [W]e have no authority to do that, because
there is no federal policy that the fund should always win. Our cases
have previously rejected "more money" arguments remarkably
similar to the one made here.
Even less persuasive-indeed, positively probative of the dangers of
respondent's facile approach to federal-common-law-making-is
[the] contention that it would "disserve the federal program" to
permit California to insulate "the attorney's or accountant's
malpractice," imposing costs "on the nation's taxpayers . . . ." By
presuming to judge what constitutes malpractice, this argument
demonstrates the runaway tendencies of "federal common law"
untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as opposed to judicially
constructed) federal policy. What sort of tort liability to impose on
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lawyers and accountants in general, and on lawyers and accountants
who provide services to federally insured financial institutions in
particular,"'involves a host of considerations that must be weighed
and appraised' . . . . 'Within the federal system, at least, we have
decided that that function of weighing and appraising" 'is more
appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who
interpret them.'" 74
First, the Court in O'Melveny & Myers provides guidance as to what
activities are "national programs" for which uniform federal common law
should be developed. Such activities are the Government's payment of
checks, interpretation of Government contracts, and other Government
business transactions where "uniform rules of decision" are needed to
"govern the primary conduct of the United States or . .. its agents or
contractors." 171 In other words, federal courts have the authority to protect
the Government by developing federal common law to displace state law if
the law is likely to significantly increase the Government's cost of basic
business activities, i.e. disbursing funds, acquiring and managing real
property, and purchasing goods and services. Additionally, displacement of
state law may be appropriate particularly when the law places burdens on
activities within the exclusive responsibility of the Government, i.e.
development and purchase of military equipment.
In O'Melvney & Myers, the Supreme Court also provided important
instruction regarding the extent of conflict that must exist to authorize
development of federal common law in areas other than those involving the
Government's "primary conduct." 176 Before the federaljudiciary may create
federal common law, rather than use state law, there must be a "significant
conflict" between a specific federal policy or interest and state law which
suggests that the conflict must justify preemption of the state law.r
7
Furthermore, state law may be displaced only to the extent that the policy or
interest requires it. Arguments for uniformity, or "more money," are
174 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87-89 (citations omitted).
175 Id. at 88; Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,506-09 (1988) (Federal common law rule
of Government contractor defense displaced state law that would have imposed liability upon defense
contractor for product liability because of manufacture of military helicopter as contract and specifications
required); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1947) (Government war materials
procurement contract); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (Bank's liability to
United States for negotiating Government check with forged endorsement).
176 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87.
177 Id. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of the words "significant conflict" in the
context of preemption of state law, see infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
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generally insufficient to justify the creation of federal common law that
would displace state law. 7'
To understand the Supreme Court's criticism of the "most generic (and
lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests, the interest in uniformity" and "runaway
tendencies offederal common law' untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as opposed to
judicially constructed)federal policy,"179 it is necessary to examine the response of
the United States Supreme Court, and the courts of appeals, to Kimbell Foods,
Omaha Indian Tribes, and Milwaukee v. Illinois. After the decisions in those
cases were handed down, the United States continued to assert the need for
development of uniform common federal law and cited supporting language
in Kimbell Foods concerning the need for uniformity by federal programs.'8"
In response to that argument, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals read Kimbell
Foods, Omaha Indian Tribes, and Milwaukee v. Illinois as limiting the
displacement of state law to situations in which state decisional rules would
"hinder the administration of" a federal program."" Given the Supreme
Court's statements about the limitations upon the development of federal
common law in such decisions,'82 as well as the federalism and separation of
power concerns underlying those decisions,'8s the Sixth Circuit's approach
was clearly warranted and arguably mandated.
In deciding whether an alter ego theory could be used to pierce the
corporate veil in the absence of fraud, other federal courts have paid limited
attention to Omaha Indian Tribes, Milwaukee v. Illinois, and the rule set forth
in Kimbell Foods.'8 Instead, those courts focused on statements in Kimbell
Foods regarding federal programs' need for uniformity, which justifies the
creation of federal common law. 8 The Third Circuit Court ofAppeals held
that because the Medicare program and a variety of its objectives required
178 Id. at 87-88.
179 Id. at 88, 89 (emphasis added).
ISO United States v. Certain Real Property at 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 347-49 (6th Cir.
1990); United States v.Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. 768 F.2d 686, 689, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 86-89 (3d Cir. 1981).
Isi 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 347-49 (rejecting the Government's argument that uniform rules
were needed to effectuate the goals of the federal forfeiture scheme and finding that state property law
should be applied as decisional rules because they "will not hinder the administration of' the federal
program).
182 See supra notes 148-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions
in Kimbell Foods, Omaha Indian Tribes, and Milwaukee v. Illinois.
183 See supra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
184 See generally, Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d 686; Pisani, 646 F.2d 83.
185 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) ("Undoubtedly, federal
programs that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules.");Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 690 n.6; Pisani, 646 F.2d at
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uniformity, federal common law should be developed to decide alter ego
liability issues arising in an action to recover Medicare overpayments. 8'6 In
doing so, the court simply stated that "a uniform rule is needed since state
law could frustrate specific objectives of the Medicare program,"'87 and rather than
determine the New Jersey law of alter ego liability, the court assumed that
state law "might be more restrictive" than federal law."s Similarly, when the
issue of piercing the corporate veil arose in a False Claims Act case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the claims involved payments by
a national cotton subsidy program, uniformity was necessary, and federal
common law should govern.'
9
After O'Melveny &Myers, the Supreme Court decidedAtherton v. FDIC,'90
another case involving an action by the FDIC as a bank's receiver.' 9' The
Supreme Court ultimately gave the FDIC a victory in Atherton, but once
again rejected an argument for federal common law based upon the Cleafield
Trust Doctrine.' 92 In doing so, the Supreme Court found a number of
reasons why the purported need for "uniformity" did not exist once federal
laws and regulations concerning banks were examined. 93 Additionally, the
Court found that there were no other conflicts between state law and federal
policy or interests to justify federal common law. 4
The decisions in Kimbell Foods and Omaha Indian Tribes confirm that
federalism concerns, stemming from economic actors' reliance on state law
to shape transactions, are one reason for the Supreme Court's limitations
upon the Clearfield Trust Doctrine. In Kimbell Foods, the Court's decision
explicitly found it to be inappropriate to adopt uniform federal common law
that would disrupt state law governing creditors' rights because businesses
rely on such laws when carrying out transactions.19 5 Similarly, in Omaha
Indian Tribes the Supreme Court declined to use federal common law because
it would disrupt the state law on which real estate owners relied to determine
their property rights.
196
186 Pisani, 646 F.2d at 86-89.
197 Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
188 Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
189 Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 690 n.6. InJon-T Chemicals, the court did not decide that it
needed to create a special rule of federal law regarding alter ego liability. Id. Instead, the court found that
as to alter ego liability Texas and federal law were essentially the same. Id.
190 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
191 Id.
192 Id at 217-31.
193 Id. at 219-24.
194 Id. at 224-26.
195 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979).
1% Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribes, 442 U.S. 653, 674-76 (1979).
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From Kimbell Foods through Atherton, the Supreme Court not only
repeatedly stated that separation of power concerns require limits to be
placed on the Clearfield Trust Doctrine, but also voiced concerns about the
disruption of state law on which economic actors rely. 197 In particular, the
Court in O'Melveny & Myers condemned, as contrary to the Constitution's
separation of powers, the development of federal common law based upon
"judicially constructed" and not "genuinely identifiable" federal policies or
interests.198  Additionally, the Court emphasized that in most cases the
federal judiciary must leave to Congress decisions on the creation of law.' 99
C. Bestfoods and the Use of Federal Common Law Doctrines To Determine
Successor Liability Under Federal Statutes
In United States v. Besfoods, the Supreme Court decided the circumstances
under which a parent corporation was liable under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), for
the activities of a subsidiary in releasing hazardous substances into the
environment. °° At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court discussed
the common law rule that shareholders are not liable for the activities of a
corporation, that rule's application in the case of parent and subsidiary
corporations, and "piercing the corporate veil," a traditional exception to that
common law rule.2°' At one point, the Court describes the rule of a parent
corporation's limited liability as "'ingrained in our economic and legal
systems.'"
202
Additionally, the Supreme Court points out that despite scholarly
criticism of limited parent corporation liability where a subsidiary is a
197 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 ("Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state
law is primarily a decision for Congress, not the federal courts.") (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1963); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1994); limbell Foods,
440 U.S. at 739-40. In Kimbdll Foods, the court stated its federalism concern as follows:
Because the ultimate consequences of altering settled commercial practices are so difficult to
foresee, we hesitate to create new uncertainties in the absence of careful legislative
deliberation... [unless]... necessary to vindicate important national interests.... [T]he
prudent course is to adopt the ready made body of state law as the federal rule of decision until
Congress decides to strike a different accommodation.
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 739-40.
198 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 89.
199 Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981)).
For a further discussion of NorhwestAirlines, see, infra, notes 318-23, 343-51, 369-86 and accompanying
text.
o United States v. Bessfoods, 524 U.S. 60 (1998).
201 Id. at 61-63.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
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polluter, "nothing in CERCLA purports to reject this bedrock principle, and
against this common-law backdrop the congressional silence is audible."2 3
As to the principle of piercing the corporate veil to find a corporate parent
liable under CERCLA, the Court adds:
Nothing in CERCLA purports to rewrite this well-settled rule,
either. CERCLA is thus like many another congressional enactment
in giving no indication that 'the entire corpus of state corporation
law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiffs cause of action is
based upon a federal statute,' . . . and the failure of the statute to
speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of
corporate ownership demands application of the rule that '[i]n order
to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly
to the question addressed by the common law.'2°
The Court in Besfoods concluded its discussion of parent liability for a
subsidiary's activities by agreeing with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
that a parent corporation is only liable derivatively under CERCLA if the
corporate veil of its subsidiary may be pierced. 205 This decision refuted the
positions of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits which had
all agreed that federal courts should fashion a uniform federal law of
corporate liability under CERCLA. As the First Circuit stated subsequently
in United States v. Davis,206 the Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods "left
little room for the creation of a federal rule of [corporate] liability" under
CERCLA.
207
The Second Circuit agreed in New York v. National Services Industries,
Inc.,2 8 acknowledging the decision in Bes!oods required overruling of B.F.
Goodrich v. Betkoski.2' According to the Second Circuit,
we take from Bestfoods the principle that when determining whether
liability under CERCLA passes from one corporation to another, we
must apply common law rules and not create CERCLA-specific
rules. Because the substantial continuity test adopted in Betkoski
20 Id. at 62.
24 Id. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979) and United States v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529,534 (1993)) (citations omitted).
M 524 U.S. at 63-64.
2% 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
X7 Id. at 54.
M 352 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2003).
W9 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
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departs from the common law rules of successor liability, Betkoski is
no longer good law.210
The pre-Besy'oods position of the five Courts of Appeals is one example
of the lower federal courts' willingness to develop federal common law rules
and use common law analysis despite contrary Supreme Court precedent.
Before 1996, only the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied state law to
decide "successor liability" under CERCLA.2 ' Now, only the Third,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits recognize the need for a federal common law of
"successor liability" for CERCLA matters.212 While their decisions are not
in total agreement, the First, Second and Ninth Circuits now agree that
Bes!foods or other Supreme Court decisions support the conclusion that there
is no justification for developing a federal common law of "successor
liability" for CERCLA that differs from state law.2 13
The Bestfoods decision and the contrary court of appeals decisions
highlight a conflict between Supreme Court and the courts of appeals on the
development of federal common law. Before Bestfoods, Supreme Court
decisions made it clear that development of federal common law should be
the exception and not the rule. As a result, some federal courts and
individual judges questioned the use of the substantial continuity test rather
than state law to decide successor liability questions arising in actions under
federal statutes.2"4 However, many of the courts of appeals accepted the
210 Nat'l Serv. Indus., 352 F.3d at 685.
211 City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244,250-51 (6th Cir. 1994) (determining that
state law and not federal common law governed the issue of successor liability under CERCLA) (citing
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991).
212 United States v. General Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Exide Technologies v. United States, 74 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. March 31, 2006) (No. 05-1269);
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486-87 (8th Cir. 1992); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v.
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90-92 (3rd Cir. 1988).
213 In Nat'l Sewv. Indus., at 685-87 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, C.J.), the court continued to insist that
federal common law and not state law governs the scope of successor liability under CERCLA.
Nonetheless, the court found that Bes#foods foreclosed the use of the substantial continuity doctrine. On
the other hand, the First Circuit found in Besyfoods justification for its decision in John S. Boyd Co., Inc.
v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401,406 (1st Cir.1993) that state law should determine successor liability in
CERCLA cases. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001). A year before Beslfoods, the Ninth
Circuit held in light ofAtherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997), that state law and not distinct federal
common law should decide successor liability under CERCLA and overruled Louisiana-Pacfic Corp. v.
Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260 (1990). Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 132 F.3d 1295, 1298-
1301 (9th Cir. 1997).
214 See infra notes 251-55, 305-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal courts' use of
the substantial continuity test in cases involving the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, to determine whether a
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development of federal common law and the substantial continuity test
notwithstanding contrary Supreme Court precedent.
Beqoods addresses a fundamental issue that most lower courts have
ignored when adopting the substantial continuity test as federal common law
to fill the "interstices" of federal statutes. The issue is whether common law
analysis should be used to fill the gaps of federal statutes or whether another
type of analysis should be used. In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court adopted a
rule that avoids common law analysis as much as possible.
1. ThE SEVENTH CRCUIT QUESTIONS THE USE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL
CoNTurFY DOCTRNE AND REJECTS THE USE OF OTHER FEDERAL
COMMON LAW.
Ten years ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the
blanket use of the substantial continuity doctrine to decide successor liability
in Title VII cases. 215 At that time, the court commented on the doctrine,
stating
[t]he reason for this special federal common law doctrine of
successor liability-this departure from the more limited approach
of the common law generally-is a little elusive, especially in a case
such as this in which the actual violator is fully answerable for the
consequences of the violation.216
Ultimately, the court applied the doctrine because the "defendants d[id] not
challenge [its] application." 217 This hint that parties should question the use
of the substantial continuity test came five months after the Supreme Court's
decision in O'Melveny & Myers.2 '8 There, the Supreme Court rejected the
development of a uniform federal common law rule for imputing corporate
officers' knowledge to a corporation.2 9 The FDIC sought to have a uniform
rule established for actions that it brought, as a receiver, to recover funds on
behalf of failed savings and loans.2 °
business, which purchased substantially all of another firm's assets and had common management and
employees, was a successor of the seller. For a discussion of courts' lack of enthusiasm for the substantial
continuity test as a state common law rule, see infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
215 EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 1994).
216 Id. at 748.
217 Id.
218 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
219 Id. at 85-89.
! Id. at 83, 85.
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When the hint in EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc. is read in light of O'Melveny &
Myers, the Seventh Circuit's decision suggests an early recognition of the
significance of the Supreme Court ruling. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court's decision in O'Melveny & Myers represented one of many instances
where the Court narrowed the application of the Clea feld Trust Doctrine.'
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court indicated a two-pronged
analysis is necessary to determine whether a federal statute requires
development of federal law to displace state law.
In the first step of the analysis, the Court examined the statutory text and
legislative history of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act ("FIREEA") to determine if Congress intended federal
common law to displace state law.m Second, the Court considered whether
there was any conflict between an important federal interest and state law,
which would justify displacement of that law.Y3 This two-step analysis was
an important foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in the subsequent
decisions of Atherton224 and Bestfoods.225  In Atherton, the Supreme Court
applied the two-step analysis by first noting the absence of any important
federal interest that conflicted with applicable state laws. 6 The Court then
examined the text, legislative history, and background of the relevant statute's
enactment and determined that Congress had intended for state and not
federal common law to fill the interstices of the statute. 7
In Besfoods, the Supreme Court refined the two-pronged analysis of
Atherton and O'Melveny & Myers by holding that, as to long-standing rules of
state law, there is a presumption that Congress intended the use of the state
law to fill the interstices of a statute. 22s Because there was no dispute in
Bestfoods as to the liability of the parent corporation under either state or
federal rules for piercing the corporate veil, the Supreme Court did not reach
the issue of whether there was any conflict between state law and federal
interests that required the displacement of state law. 9
In their pre-Bestfoods decisions, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals held, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed, and
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that federal courts should
2' Id. at 87-89. See the discussion of Cleafield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), and
other Clearfield Trust Doctrine decisions by the Supreme Court, supra Part III, III.B.
a! O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85-87.
2Z Id. at 87-89.
2 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
ns 524 U.S. 60 (1998).
226 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218-26 (1997).
7 Id. at 226-31.
228 Bes#foods, 524 U.S. at 61-64.
M Id. at 63 n.9.
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develop a uniform federal common law of successor liability for CERCLA.230
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits accepted that the substantial
continuity test should be borrowed from NLRB and LMRA cases because
the test was consistent with the policies of CERCLA.231
In subsequent decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits, which
overruled B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski and Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco
respectively, each of the two Courts of Appeals rejected the notion that
CERCLA requires the development of a uniform federal law of successor
liability that differs from state law.232 The decisions of New York v. National
Services Industries, Inc. and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Brown &
Bryant, Inc. raise serious doubts about the validity of the decisions by the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Carolina Transformer Co. and by the Eight
Circuit in United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co. Those decisions accepted
that in CERCLA cases, the development of a federal common law of
successor liability includes the substantial continuity test. Doubts regarding
these cases are especially strong because the court of appeals in National
Services Industries overruled Betkoski in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bestfoods.
23
The validity of Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed and Seed are even
more suspicious because each decision relies on the Third Circuit's decision
in Smith Land & Improvement in which the court only had to decide whether
caveat emptor could be raised as a defense in CERCLA actions.2 These two
2M B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505,581-519 (2d Cir.1996), overruled by NewYorkv. Nat'l
Servs. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832,
837-38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,486-87 (8th Cir. 1992);
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1262-64 (1990), overruled by Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry.
v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex
Corp., 851 F.2d 86,90-92 (3rd Cir. 1988). The Court's discussion of federal common law in Smith Land
is arguably nothing more than dicta because evidence existed to support a finding of successor liability
based on a theory ofstatutory merger or consolidation. Id. However, the Third Circuit recently rejected
that reading of Smith Land. United States v. General Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294. 298 (3d Cir. 2005)
(Smith Land's discussion of the use of federal common law was "unambiguous, essential to the Smith Land
disposition, and controlling on the issue before us. Smith Land expressly rejected the position that a
particular state's successor liability law applies under CERCLA.").
2 B.F. Goodrich, 99 F.3d at 519; Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 837-38; Mexico Feed and Seed
Co., 980 F.2d at 487-90.
232 National Sew. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682 (overruling Betkoski); Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry. 132
F.3d at 1298-1301 (overruling Louisiana-Pacific Corp v. Asarco).
2M Besyfoods, 524 U.S. 60.
23 Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 88. To the extent there was evidence of record
before the Court in Smith Land & Improvement Corp. concerning the potential liability of the defendants,
it indicated that the corporate transactions at issue were statutory mergers or consolidations that may have
resulted in successor liability without resort to the substantial continuity test. Id. at 91. Furthermore, the
Court never stated that the use of the substantial continuity test was appropriate in CERCIA cases. It
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decisions cannot be considered persuasive precedent when there is
disagreement among numerous federal appellate courts, and the only
appellate court opinion that supports the Fourth and Eighth Circuit decisions
appears to be obiter dicta. Finally, the continued validity of the Mexico Feed
and Seed is questionable because even though the court assumed that only
federal law and not state law should be used to decide successor liability, the
court ultimately found no liability.235
Even if the Courts in Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed and Seed were
correct that federal common law should be used to decide successor liability
under CERCLA, their adoption of the substantial continuity test is
questionable in light of Bes~foods and the Third Circuit's decision in United
States v. General Battery Corporation.23" The majority in General Battery
maintains that Smith Land & Development remains good law in light of
Besgfoods. 7 Nonetheless, the court held that under CERCLA, the federal
common law of successor liability includes only "'the general doctrine of
successor liability in operation in most states.' 238 Ultimately, the General
Battery court held that the substantial continuity test was not part of the
doctrine of successor liability in most states.239
Although it is doubtful that the Third Circuit's decision in Smith Land
& Development remains viable in light of Besgfoods, the Court of Appeals
certainly was correct that the substantial continuity test is not accepted as part
of the common law of successor liability in most states. Thirty years ago in
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. ,24 the Michigan Supreme Court followed
the First Circuit's interpretation of New Hampshire law in Cyr v. B. Offen
only acknowledged that the EPA had advocated the use of a "'continuity of business operation approach,'"
Id. at 91, n.2, and stated that the district court should use "the general doctrine of successor liability in
operation in most states." Id. at 92. The EPA has expressed the view that a "need for uniformity"justifies
the use of federal common law, and the continuity of business operation test, to decide corporate liability
issues that arise under CERCLA, EPA Memorandum, "Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor
Corporations For Abandoned Sites Under CERCL.A," Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (June 13,1984). However, that legal opinion deserves respect
only if persuasive. E.g. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,586-87 (2000); Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 61 (1995). The memorandum's persuasiveness is weak, and perhaps non-existent, given the
wealth of subsequent Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions contrary to Smith Land &
Improvement Corp.
235 Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d at 488-90.
2M 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005),petitionfor cert.filed sub nom. Exide Technologies v. United States,
74 U.S.L.W. 3572 (U.S. March 31, 2006) (No. 05-1269)..
237 Id. at 298-301.
2M Id. at 298 (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988)).
2 Id. at 309.
240 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-84 (1976).
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& Co., Inc.24 and adopted the continuity of enterprise test, another name for
the substantial continuity test, to impose successor liability upon a
purchasing corporation where it acquired the selling corporation's assets for
cash, but the purchaser retained the seller's key personnel, assets, general
business operations and name; the seller ceased operations and dissolved
soon after receiving payments for its assets, the purchaser assumed the debts
and liabilities of the seller to the extent necessary to continue the seller's
normal business operations, and the purchaser held itself out as the
continuation of the seller.242 Subsequently, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court repudiated the First Circuit's decision in Cyr"43 and courts have
overwhelmingly rejected the test as a state common law rule of successor
liability, 2" and the test has not been recognized as valid law by the
Restatement of Law of Torts.245
For the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the "hint" in G-K-G proved
to be prophesy. As a result, the court of appeals subsequently applied the
two-pronged analysis ofO'Melveny & Myers and Besfoods injames Papa v. Kty
Industries, Inc.246 The court held that the state law rule of piercing the
corporate veil usually should be applied to determine affiliate liability in
separate cases under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"). 2 47  Applying Besyfoods, the court held not only that the
corporate veil of affiliated corporations should not be pierced, but also the
241 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974) In determining whether successor liability existed as a matter of
New Hampshire law, the Court of Appeals in Cyr relied upon decisions in which the United States
Supreme Court, as a matter of federal law, approved the National Labor Relations Board's use of the
substantial continuity test in National Labor Relations Act cases and extended its use to cases involving
the Labor Mangement Relations Act. Id. at 1152-53, discussing, Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); N.L.R.B. v. Bums International Security Services, 406 U.S.
272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
242 Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d at 881-84.
243 Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 568-69 (2003) (reiterating New
Hampshire Surpreme Court's statement that Cyr does not accurately reflect New Hampshire common
law), citing Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (1988) (stating that Cyr does not
reflect New Hampshire law of product liability and risk-spreading in tort matters).
244 Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co. 18 P.3d 49, 55-56 & nn. 32-35 (Alaska 2001)
(adopting continuity of enterprise test, identifying Alabama and Michigan as other states that have adopted
test, misidentifying New Hampshire as state that has adopted test and noting that from 18 to 22 state or
federal courts have rejected it as state law); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. S 12, Reporters'
Note, cmt. c (1998).
245 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. S 12, cmt. c & Reporters' Note, cmt. c (1998).
246 Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939-42 (7th Cir. 1999).
247 Id.
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corporations were not an employer with sufficient employees requiring
application of Title VII and the ADEA.24s
Despite the parties' acceptance of the "integrated enterprise" test in their
arguments, the Seventh Circuit in Papa declined to adopt the test used by the
NLRB to decide affiliate liability issues for Title VII cases.249 The court
could not "blame the lawyers for structuring their analysis this way, because
we and other courts of appeals have often done likewise....
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts have not
been as quick to embrace Bestfoods. Despite the decision in Bestoods, the
majority in General Battery held that federal common law should be used to
decide successor liability under CERCLA and declined to read Atherton,
O'Melveny & Myers and Bestfoods as contrary to prior court of appeals'
decisions. 25' The district court in New York v. National Service Industries also
found reason to disregard Besfoods.252 In some cases, both the parties and the
courts assumed the applicability of federal common law. In Brzozowski v.
Correctional Physician Services, Inc. ,253 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and
248 Id.
249 Id. at 939-40.
25 Id. at 939.
251 US v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005). The court of appeals found that Exide
Corporation, as successor to General Battery Corp., was also the successor of Price Battery, which General
Battery acquired before merging with Exide. Id. at 296, 305-08. In a concurring and dissenting opinion,
Judge Rendell agreed with the result reached by the majority. Id. at 309-18. She nevertheless maintained
that, in light of decisions such as United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals should reconsider the decisions of Smith Land &Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,
91-92 (3d Cir. 1988) and Lansford-CoaldaleJoint WaterAuth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993).
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 298-304.
252 New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Even within the
Seventh Circuit, courts have not been quick to embrace Besfoods. In N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., the
Seventh Circuit declined to reach the issue of whether state law or federal common law should decide
corporate successorship issues because the parties assumed that federal common law applied and did not
brief the issue. 152 F.3d 642, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1998). Subsequently, a district court within the Seventh
Circuit held that federal common law, and the substantial continuity test, should decide successor liability
in CERCLA cases without discussing the state law versus uniform federal common law issue raised by
Bestfoods and Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997). Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., No. 98 C 1619,
2001 WL 710116, at *22-24 (N.D. Ill.June 25,2001). The district court assumed that CERCIA requires
a uniform law of successor liability, which includes the substantial continuity test. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., at
*22-24. Although the court clearly was aware ofN. Shore Gas Co. and EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740
(7th Cir. 1994), it ignored the Seventh Circuit's hints in those cases to use state law, rather than federal
common law, and the court of appeal's embrace of Bestfoods in Papa, 166 F.3d at 937. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
2001 WL 710116, at *23. However, there is no indication that the parties raised the Besfoods issue, and
by finding that the alleged successor could not be held liable under the mere continuation or substantial
continuity test, the district court disposed of the successorship issue in a manner that made an appeal less
likely.
23 360 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2004).
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the plaintiff-and apparently the alleged successor as well-accepted without
question that the substantial continuity doctrine should be applied to decide
whether an asset purchaser is a corporate successor for the purposes of a Title
VII gender discrimination action.2
Examination of the Supreme Court decision in Bestfoods and other
precedent, including O'Melveny &Myers, demonstrates that those courts have
ignored relevant Supreme Court precedent. Their disregard of the Supreme
Court precedent may have occurred because the lower courts have
overlooked, ignored, or denied the significance of Bestfoods as part of the
Supreme Court's efforts to limit use of common law analysis when deciding
how to fill the interstices of federal statutes.
2. SUBSTANTiL CoNTnurnTESTzNLMRA, TrnE VHAND CERCLA
CASES
Originally, the NLRB developed the substantial continuity test to
determine a successor employer's liability under the National Labor
Relations Act, and the Supreme Court approved the Board's use of the test
in Fall River Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB2ss and Golden State Bottling
Co. v. NLRB. 2 6 Later, the Supreme Court referred to the test in two cases
involving the LMRA.257 Subsequently, in decisions questionable in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services,
Inc., federal appellate courts read Golden State Bottling and other LMRA
decisions as establishing the substantial continuity test as the means to
2 Id. at 177-79. In contrast, at least one court of appeals has held that the Federal Advisory
Committee Act ("FACA") does not provide an implied private right of action despite a 16-year-old
assumption by the Supreme Court and other federal courts that FACA did so. Manshardt v. Fed. judicial
Qualifications Comm., 408 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).
255 482 U.S. 27, 42-43 (1987).
'% 414 U.S. 168, 171-72 (1973).
257 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 544 (1964), the Court referred to the
substantial continuity test, but ultimately found successor liability under traditional state law because of
a corporate merger. The Court in the second decision declined to find successor liability because the
alleged successor never hired most of the asset seller's employees. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,251-52 (1974). In NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 286
(1972), the Court explained the Wiley decision as a "holding [that] dealt with a merger occurring against
a backdrop of state law that embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation
is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." See also Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal
Co., 256 F.3d 819, 826-30 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (SantelleJ., concurring).
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determine successor liability in cases applying the LMRA.28 Lower courts
later adopted the doctrine for use in Title VII cases.259
The Supreme Court decision in Bes~oods, the decisions by courts of
appeal in National Services Industries, Inc. and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway, and the decisions of the Seventh Circuit also raise doubts about the
Third Circuit's application of federal common law and the substantial
continuity test in Title VII actions. Yet, parties and federal courts continue
to assume that the test should be applied to decide successor liability in
CERCLA and Title VII cases.
3. FOUNDATIONS OF BBSTFOODS
In quick, shorthand fashion, the Supreme Court in Bestfoods dismissed
the proposition that some law (other than state common law) may apply to
decide whether, under CERCLA, a parent corporation is liable for a
subsidiary's actions. As support, the Court cites three prior decisions:
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,2' Burks v. Lasker,26 and United
States v. Texas.262 Those decisions are one starting point for understanding
the significance of Bestfoods.
In Edmonds, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act had changed the traditional maritime law, which imposed upon multiple
2M See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177 (discussing Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. 168, and John
Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1089-91 (6th
Cir. 1974) (discussingHowardJohnson Co., 417 U.S. 249); see also Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co.,
256 F.3d at 825 (discussingJohn Wiley & Sons, Golden State Bottling and HowardJohnson Co.). In Bums Int'l
Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. at 286, the Court explained that the Wiley decision as a "holding dealt with a
merger occurring against a backdrop of state law that embodied the general rule that in merger situations
the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." See also Holland,
256 F.3d at 826-30 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Santelle, J., concurring). For the purposes of this article, it is not
crucial whether the federal appellate courts are correct in stating that the substantial continuity test should
be applied to determine successor liability in LMRA cases.
259 E.g., Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177 (discussing EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.,
503 F.2d 1086, 1089-91 (6th Cir. 1974)); G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d at 748 (accepting parties' assumption that
the substantial continuity test should be used to decide successor liability under Title VII). Interestingly,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 F.3d 396, 401-03 (3d
Cir. 1999), did not invoke the substantial continuity test by name, but instead indicated it was deciding
successor liability under the mere continuation test, a traditional rule developed by state courts. In Rego,
the court affirmed the district court's decision that there was no basis for successor liability. Rego, 181
F.3d at 401-403.
2W 443 U.S. 256 (1979), cited in Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62.
21 441 U.S. 471 (1979), cited in Bes oods, 524 U.S. at 62.
M 507 U.S. 529 (1993), cited in Besyoods, 524 U.S. at 63.
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tortfeasors joint and several liability for an indivisible injury to a
longshoreman. 263 The Court stated that "we are unpersuaded that Congress
intended to upset a 'long-established and familiar principle' of maritime law
by imposing a proportionate-fault rule" and found that joint and several
liability remained the law.2' According to the Court, the language of the
1972 amendment did not specifically change the traditional rule of law.265
Instead, the amendment dealt with issues concerning the liability of a
stevedoring company to a vessel when an injured longshoreman sued the
vessel, and the liability of a vessel to a longshoreman hired by the vessel to
provide stevedoring services. 
266
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found nothing in the legislative history
to indicate that Congress intended to change the traditional maritime law
concerning thejoint and several liability of multiple tortfeasors. 267 According
to the Court,
[t]he legislative history strongly counsels against [an] interpretation
of the statute, which modifies the longshoreman's pre-existing rights
against the negligent vessel. The reports and debates leading up to
the 1972 Amendment contain not a word of this concept. This
silence is most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an
important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely.
268
That same year, the Supreme Court considered the case of Burks v.
Lasker.269 There the Court was faced with the issue of whether a state law,
which allowed disinterested directors of a corporation to end a derivative
suit, should apply to an implied right of action under the Investors Company
Act and Investors Advisors Act.270 The Court held that the state law rule
should apply even though the plaintiffs had an implied cause of action under
federal statutes.27 The Court stated,
[T] he first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate
directors is the relevant State's corporation laws. Corporations are
26 Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 258-60 (1979).
2 Id. at 263-73.
2 Id. at 262-65.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 266-68.
2M6 Id. at 266-67.
2M 269441 U.S. 471 (1979).
z Id. at 473.
Z71 Id. at 480-86.
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creatures of state law, and it is state law which is the font of corporate
directors' powers.... In short, in this field congressional legislation
is generally enacted against the background of existing state law;
Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state
corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff s cause of
action is based upon a federal statute.272
In United States v. Texas, 2 73 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Debt Collection Act had abolished the long-standing federal common law
rule that the United States may recover pre-judgment interest when
appearing as a plaintiff in a breach of contract claim. 4 In finding that the Act
did not abolish that federal common law rule, the Court stated, "'[s]tatutes
which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except
when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.' In such cases, Congress
does not write upon a clean slate."27' The Court also stated that the
presumption applies if the existing law is state common law, federal maritime
law, or federal common law "[a]lthough a different standard applies when
analyzing the effect of federal legislation on state law....
In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court relied in large apart upon
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino.2' There, the Court
considered whether, in an ADEA case, preclusive effect should be given to
a state agency's determination, which had not been reviewed by any state
court, that an employer had not discriminated against an employee because
of his age. 278 As a first principle, the Supreme Court stated that in adopting
the ADEA
... Congress is understood to legislate against a background of
common-law adjudicatory principles. Thus, where a common-law
principle is well established, as are the rules of preclusion, the courts
may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an
7 Id. at 478.
273 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
276 Id. (citation omitted).
M 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
278 U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534.
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expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.'
2 79
Ultimately, the Court held that a state administrative adjudication,
unreviewed by a state court, should not be given preclusive effect. The
rationale for this decision was that it would conflict with provisions of
ADEA, which stated that an employee could bring an action despite an
unsuccessful proceeding before a state agency and it would be contrary to
policies of the ADEA and Title VII. 2
The Supreme Court decisions on which Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
relies for the most part involve questions of preclusion decided as a matter
of federal law, but the Court does not indicate whether it is deciding the
issues as a matter of state or federal law.28' It also relies on an admiralty
case.2s2 In one of the decisions, Briscoe v. LaHue,2t 3 the Supreme Court
considered two cases in which convicted criminals sought to bring 42
U.S.C. § 1983 actions against police officers based on allegations that the
officers presented perjured testimony at the plaintiffs' criminal trials. 284 The
Court held that Section 1983 did not provide a cause of action against the
police officers.285 In a lengthy discussion, the Court found that by the time
of the enactment of Section 1983, common law immunity was well-
established for all persons, including witnesses, who were integral parts of
the judicial process.2' Furthermore, it found nothing in the legislative
history of Section 1983 to show that Congress intended to revoke immunity
287
and allow suits against government officials who gave perjured testimony.
Similarly, the Supreme Court inAtherton v. FDIC rejected the argument
that in adopting 12 U.S.C. 1821(k), and thereby creating a gross negligence
standard for bank officials' liability to the FDIC as a bank's receiver,
279 Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 108 (citations omitted).
2W Id. at 110-14.
21 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (preclusion issue decision based
on federal law); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (preclusion issue
decision in patent litigation based on federal law); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371 (1940) (defendant invokes resjudicata based on prior bankruptcy case; decision does not
indicate whether issue is one of state or federal law). The Court also cites United States v. Tudey, 352 U.S.
407 (1957), which involves use of common law definition of terms to interpret a federal criminal statute.
See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 108.
M Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952).
zu 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
29 Id. at 326-27.
2 Id.
28 Id. at 335-36.
287 Id. at 336-41.
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Congress intended to override state law under which a bank director or
officer could be found liable under a standard of care less than gross
negligence, such as negligence. 288 Rather, the Court held that the statute's
language, the background of its adoption, and its legislative history showed
a congressional intent to establish a minimum for statutory actions pursuant
to Section 1821(k) while allowing actions under state law when a lesser
standard existed.28
In its decisions before Bestfoods, including Atherton, O'Melveny & Myers,
Burks v. Lasker, Astoria Federal Savings & Loan, and Briscoe v. La Hue, the
Supreme Court recognized that when Congress enacts a statute it is
presumed to leave undisturbed long-standing rules of law, including state
law. To overcome that presumption, either the language of the federal
statute or its legislative history must show a congressional intent to displace
the long-standing law.290 In addition, the long-standing law may be displaced
if it conflicts with a specific purpose of a federal statute.291
The Supreme Court also indicated to what degree a conflict must exist
between a federal statute's purpose and long-standing state law in order to
displace the state law. In its discussion of the presumption of the continued
existence of state law, the Supreme Court in United States v. Texas cited with
approval the case of City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois.292 There, the Supreme Court
indicated that absent explicit or implicit field preemption,
Congressional enactments that do not exclude all state legislation in
the same field nevertheless override state laws with which they
conflict. The criterion for determining whether state and federal
laws are so inconsistent that the state law must give way is firmly
established in our decisions. Our task is "to determine whether,
under the circumstances of this particular case, [the State's] law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 93
28 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,226-31 (1997).
- Id. See also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1994) (discussing how, in
adopting FIRREA, Congress showed no intent to override presumption that state law should be used to
fill interstices of statutes).
2 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 226-31; O'Melveny & Myen, 512 U.S. at 85-87.
291 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937,940-42
(7th Cir. 1999).
M United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981)).
M City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-17.
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Similarly, the Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. stated that in
order tojustify the development of federal common law to displace state law,
a court "must also determine whether application of state law wouldfrustrate
specific objectives of ... federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules
solicitous of those federal interests." 294 Read together, the Supreme Court
decisions suggest that for a federal statute's purpose to override long-standing
state law, there must be a conflict between a statutory purpose and state law
sufficient tojustify pre-emption of the state law.
In CERCLA and Title VII cases adopting the substantial continuity test,
federal appellate courts have not followed the Bestfoods line of Supreme Court
decisions. In the CERCLA cases, the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
favored a federal common law rule to determine successor liability because
they found that CERCLA authorized the creation of federal common law to
supplement the statute and there was a need for national uniformity.295 In
the Title VII cases, the federal appellate courts adopted the test in order to
further the Congressional intent of ensuring relief for victims of
296employment discrimination. The question is whether Supreme Court
precedent, concerning federal common law, supports the use of that law in
Title VII and CERCLA cases.
D. Constitutional Concerns Behind Bestfoods and the Supreme Court's
Limitations Upon Federal Common Law
Separation of power concerns drive the Supreme Court's reluctance to
find grants of judicial power to develop a body of federal common law in
federal statutes. As the Court stated in Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.:
It is by no means enough that ...Congress could under the
Constitution readily enact a complete code of law governing
transactions in federal mineral leases among private parties. Whether
2 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (emphasis added). See also
O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87. (Cleadield Trust Doctrine justifies development of"a special federal
rule" only in "'few and restricted' ... situations where 'there is a 'significant conflict between somefederal policy
or interest and the use of state law.'") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), and the definition of the
Cleafield Trust Doctrine, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
2% See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mex. Feed and Seed Co., 980
F.2d 478,486-87 (8th Cir. 1992); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,90-92
(3d Cir. 1988).
2% EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090-92, 1094-95 (6th Cir.
1974).
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latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is
primarily a decision for Congress. Even where there is related
federal legislation... , "Congress acts against the background of the
total corpusjuris of the states."297
A similar separation of powers concern also supports the Besfoods line of
decisions. As the Supreme Court stated inAstoria Federal Savings &LoanAss'n
v. Soliminio, "[c]ourts do not, of course, have free rein to impose rules of
preclusion.. . when the interpretation of a statute is at hand. In this context,
the question is not whether [preclusion] is wise but whether it is intended
by the legislature."298 In short, the Supreme Court defers to Congress in
both the Bestfoods line of decisions and the Clearfield Doctrine decisions after
Lincoln Mills. Therefore, the Supreme Court is very unlikely to find that
either the Clearfield Trust Doctrine decisions or Lincoln Mills and its progeny
support a finding that CERCLA and the Civil Rights Act authorize federal
courts to create a body of federal common law on issues such as successor
liability.
An examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux,29 along with the legislative history of ERISA, suggests an
additional reason for the Supreme Court's finding that in enacting CERCLA,
Congress did not authorize the federal courts to create a general body of
federal common law, including successor liability rules. In Pilot Life
Insurance, the Supreme Court's finding that Congress intended courts to
create a body of federal common law is based upon language in ERISA's
legislative history that refers specifically to Section 301 of the LMRA.3 The
legislative history of ERISA was published in 1974.3 '
2 Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (citation omitted). See also
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963) ("Congress has not done here what was done in
[Lincoln Mills] and left to federal courts the creation of a federal common law for abuse of process.").
According to the Court in Wheeldin, given the opportunities and failures of Congress to legislate, "it is not
for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area." Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652.
2% 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). See also City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317 (When determining
whether federal legislation overrides federal common law, "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.").
2% 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
3W The Conference Report on ERISA, H.R. Conf Report No. 93-1280 327 (1974) states:
Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be brought by a participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify rights to receive future benefits under the
plan, and for relief for breach of fiduciary responsibility.... All such actions in Federal or State
courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similarfashion to those brought
under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.
Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 55, quoting H.R. Conf. Report No. 93-1280.
301 See id.
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Six years later Congress enacted CERCLA.3 In the legislative history
of CERCLA, there is no specific language indicating Congress intended to
empower federal courts to develop a body of federal common law for
CERCLA. In the legislative history, the discussion of federal courts'
development of federal common law indicates that references to "joint and
several" liability were eliminated from CERCLA so that courts would not
impose joint and several liability in every case. 303 Some courts read this
legislative history as showing a Congressional intent to allow federal courts
to develop federal common law regarding whether joint and several liability
is appropriate.?
The general discussion provided in CERCLA's legislative history does
not come close to the specific language in ERISA's legislative history. In
ERISA's history (after the enactment of the LMRA but before CERCLA),
Congress used direct and unambiguous language to state its intention to
authorize the creation of a body of federal common law. The language in the
CERCLA history cannot be read to do the same.
In the Besfoods line of decisions, separation of power concerns also are
present. By creating and applying a general presumption that Congress did
not intend to override long-standing state law, federal common law, or
court-developed maritime law, the Court defers to Congress and allows
Congress to decide when to disturb long-standing law. By applying the
presumption in a wide range of cases, the Supreme Court communicates that
Congress is expected to consider long-standing existing law and indicate, in
the statute or legislative history, an intent to modify that law. In other words,
the Supreme Court sees the separation of powers in the Constitution as
giving Congress complete law-making authority. Absent a clear sign from
Congress, or a clear conflict between a statutory purpose and state law, the
federal courts should not encroach by assuming that "overworked federal
legislators" have transferred "a part of their historic lawmaking function to
federal judges.""'
X2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 100 Stat. 1617,
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 9602 et seq. (2005)).
M See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 & n.23 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing
CERCLA's legislative history concerning joint and several liability); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1237-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(same); United States. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-08
(W.D. Ohio 1983) (same).
. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1237-38; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
at 806-08. But see Anspec v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991) (reading
legislative history as indicating that federal courts should use existing state law rules to decide whether
joint and several liability is appropriate).
. Friendly, supra note 74, at 192.
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Federalism concerns are likewise present in Besfoods. The Supreme
Court recognizes multiple aspects of corporate law, including limited parent
responsibility for a subsidiary's activities and "piercing the corporate veil," as
well-established state law."06 Corporations and others make their decisions,
as participants in a market economy, by relying on those state law rules. In
Bestfoods, Atherton, O'Melvney & Myers, Kimbell Foods, and Wilson v. Omaho
Tribes, the Supreme Court's view is that absent clear direction from
Congress, a clear conflict between state law and a statutory purpose, or a clear
conflict between state lawand narrowly defined "important federal interests,"
the Constitution empowers only Congress and not the federal judiciary to
override state laws and make new laws contrary to the expectations of those
market participants.
In all of the cases, the Supreme Court's reticence to overrule state law is
based upon common concerns regarding separation of powers and
federalism. Those common concerns suggest that the Supreme Court will
not apply the Clearfield Trust Doctrine to find that the federal judiciary should
develop federal common law to decide successor liability issues under
CERCLA. Similarly, those concerns make it doubtful that federal common
law should be used to develop a federal common law of successor liability for
Title VII without reference to state common law.
E. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Carolina Transformer, Mexico
Feed and Seed and Smith Land & Improvement: Divergent Paths of the
Supreme Court and the Lower Federal Courts in Using Federal Common Law
The decision in EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.307 is the
seminal court of appeals decision adopting the substantial continuity test to
determine the liability of an asset purchaser under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.3"' In accepting the substantial continuity test as appropriate to
decide the successor liability of an asset purchaser, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals relied on the legislative history of the Title VII relief provisions
to find that it granted the federal judiciary broad equitable powers to shape
relief for discrimination victims. 309 The court of appeals also found that
those broad powers included the authority to impose successor liability upon
asset purchasers.310  Finally, according to the court, similar policy
considerations between the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII
M6 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 60, 61-64 (1998).
3 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974).
8 Id.
309 Id. at 1090-92.
310 Id.
2006] FEDERAL COMMON LAW & CORPORATE LIABILITY 409
justified the use of the substantial continuity test in Title VII cases to
determine the successor liability ofan asset purchaser. 311 Subsequently, other
courts of appeals accepted the Sixth Circuit's analytical approach without
many doubts.31
The Sixth Circuit applied common law analysis, including the weighing
of policy issues and analogy, to justify use of the substantial continuity test
in a Title VII matter because it promoted federal policy against unlawful
discrimination. The court's analysis is virtually identical to the Supreme
Court's approach in Clearfield Trust and other early Clearfield Trust Doctrine
cases. That analysis has been described as identifying a federal interest and
determining as to that interest whether federal common law is "desirable,"
meaning the "degree of federal need for a federal rule."
313
1. THE PROBLEM OF MACMILLANBLOEDEL CONTAINERS
A potential problem with this approach is that it arguably results in
unfettered discretion for the federal judiciary to develop federal common
law. As one commentator has stated:
[W]hether a federal or state rule will govern an issue is generally
described as a two-stage query: one asks, first, whether the issue falls
within federal common law power and second, whether state or
federal law should be chosen. One consequence of finding that the
power to create federal common law is so broad.., is that the two-
fold inquiry often merges into one. . . . The desirability or
nondesirability of a federal rule surely influences one's judgment
311 Id. at 1089-92, 1094.
312 See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 173, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing successor liability issue presented by parties, finding successor liability may exist); Id. at 182-86
(Garth, J., dissenting) (contending no successor liability under substantial continuity doctrine); Rojas v.
TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745,750 (5th Cir. 1996) (following MacMillan Bloedd Containers); In
re Nat'l Airlines, Inc. 700 F.2d 695,698 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d
221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975) (same);
Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Servs., Civil Action No. 00-2590, slip op. at 2-4 (E.D. Pa. May 10,
2001) (parties appear to have assumed continuity test should be used but disagreed whether asset
purchaser was liable as successor under test). But see Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939-42
(7th Cir. 1999) (applying Besfoods analysis, rather than borrowing NLRB rule, to determine whether
affiliated corporations should be treated as one employer under federal discrimination statutes); EEOC
v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 1994) (questioning use of substantial continuity test to
determine successor liability in Title VII matter but applying test because parties assumed it should be
used).
313 Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 887,
944 (1986).
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whether... federal enactments have 'directed' that there be one. A
judge who thinks a federal rule is undesirable is not likely to believe
Congress presupposed it; one who believes federal law absolutely
necessary is much more likely to believe Congress had it in mind.314
The Supreme Court's analysis in Clearfield Trust thus may lead to federal
courts impinging upon the constitutionally mandated role of Congress to
decide if and when to make federal law.31' The Court's reasoning may also
allow federal courts to supplant state law that individuals expect to determine
their rights and obligations in economic transactions. 316 These separation of
power and federalism concerns are potentially aggravated where parties
assume a federal common law rule should govern an issue and a federal court
accepts that assumption.
2. SUPREME CouRT's RESPONSE TO THE MACMILLAN BLOEDEL
CONTAINERS PROBLEM
For twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has shown concern about
these separation of power and federalism concerns and endeavored to reshape
the Clearfield Trust Doctrine.317 However, that effort has been constrained by
not only the Court's own use of the Cleareld Trust Doctrine, but also lower
courts' use of common law analysis and the availability of cases allowing the
Court to reshape the doctrine.
The Supreme Court's efforts to limit the use of the Clearfield Trust
Doctrine and federal common law began more than thirty years ago.318
However, during that time a divided Supreme Court used the doctrine to
override state law when, in an area in which the Constitution gives the
federal government exclusive power, it viewed the interests of a federal
314 Id. at 950-5 1.
315 See supra notes 104-07, 126-29 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 134-39, 158-59, 195-97 and accompanying text.
317 See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 217, 231-32 (1997) (In a one paragraph opinion, O'Connor,
J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurred except to object to the majority's not relying solely on
statutory language but instead citing statute's text and "notably unhelpful legislative history" as support.);
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 90-91 (1994) (Stevens, J.,joined by Blackmun, O'Connor
and Souter,JJ., in concurring, added comments concerning the federal court's duty to ascertain applicable
state law rather than develop federal common law rule.); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribes, 442 U.S. 653,
679-80 (1979) (Blackmun,J., with whom Burger, C.J.joined, concurred but made additional comments
about the interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 194.); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)
(unanimous).
318 See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63 (1966).
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program to be at risk..319 Additionally, the Court used the doctrine to
override state law, which discriminated against a federal interest, when the
Court apparently was hesitant to use other constitutional grounds to
invalidate the discriminatory law.320
3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURTS
OF APPEALS IN FEDERAL COMMON LAW DECISIONS
During those thirty or more years, lower federal courts have shown a
great willingness to use common law analysis. For example, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.321 held that federal
common law and not state law should be used to determine contribution and
indemnity claims among the United States, Allegheny Airlines, the corporate
owner of a small airplane, and the estate of a student pilot.32 The underlying
lawsuits arose out of an aerial collision between the student pilot's aircraft
and an Allegheny passenger aircraft, under the direction of an FAA
controller, and included diversity actions and Federal Tort Claims Act
actions by the estates of the aircrafts' occupants. 3' Furthermore, the actions
were commenced in the district courts of various states and consolidated in
Indiana by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel.324
The lower federal courts also resorted to common law analysis, rather
than looking to congressional intent as shown by statutory text and legislative
history, to determine whether a federal statute provided a private party with
an implied right of action.325 Similarly, lower federal courts resorted to
319 See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-09 (1988).
320 See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). In concurring in the
judgment in Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 605-06, Justice Stewart objected to the use of "some
brooding omnipresence labeled federal common law" and would have found the Louisiana statute
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause. In his concurrence, then Justice Rehnquist agreed with
Justice Stewart that federal common law should not have been used to displace the state law. Id. at 606-
07. However, Justice Rehnquist believed that past precedent limited the Court's ability to find the statute
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause and would have found the statute to be unconstitutional
because it constituted discriminatory treatment by a State that interfered with the execution of federal
laws. Id. at 607-08.
321 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
322 Id. at 403.
323 Id. at 401.
324 Id.
32 See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416,420-21 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that absent clear legislative intent
to grant or withhold statutory implied cause of action, federal courts should ascertain the policies
underlying the law and determine whether implied action will further those policies.), rev'd 422 U.S. 66
(1975); Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same),
rev'd sub nom. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)
[hereinafter Amtrak].
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common law analysis to decide whether a federal statute provided a right to
contribution.
26
As the Supreme Court did in Lincoln Mills, the courts of appeals at times
identified statutory text, legislative history, or a combination of text and
history to justify development of federal common law.327 At times, those
courts also read Supreme Court precedent, including Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee,328 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,329 and Lincoln Mills330 as
generally authorizing the use of common law analysis to fill the interstices of
federal statues.331 In doing so, the courts ignored the specific constitutional
326 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals "resolved by reference to federal common law" the issue
of whether a defendant had a right to contribution in an anti-trust action and held that no right of
contribution existed. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901-06 (5th
Cir. 1979), affd sub nom. on other grounds, Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
Conversely, at least one federal court resorted to a federal common law analysis and found that Tide VII
allowed a contribution action. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 253, 256-57 (3d Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded sub nom.forfurther consideration in light of Northwest Airlines v. Transp. Workers, 451
U.S. 77 (1981), Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. G.C. Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935 (1981). In her
dissent in Glus, Judge Sloviter argued that Congressional intent should govern whether or not a statute
created an implied cause of action and viewed the majority's use of a common law analysis as
.overstep[ping] into the legislature's domain." Glus, 629 F.2d at 262-68 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Many
other federal courts accepted, without lengthy discussion, that Title VII may provide a right to
contribution. See cases cited in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Tramp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 84 n.l1
(1981).
327 See Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 626, 627 n.14, 629-32 (7th Cir. 1980)
(contending that policy considerations expressed in Illinois v. Milwaukee regarding the legislative history
and various provisions of the Clean Water Act supported a finding that federal common law provided
State action for nuisance against defendant polluting Lake Michigan); Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres
of Land, 563 F.2d 1178, 1189-91 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding provisions of Federal Power Act, legislative
history, and background of its adoption justified use of federal common law rules to determine
appropriate compensation in condemnation action by utility company.); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel
Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (6th Cir. 1974).
328 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
329 403 U.S. 388(1971). In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court made clear that Bivens could
not be read so broadly. Rather, the Supreme Court read Bivens to mean that in cases of constitutional
violations, the jurisdictional grant of28 U.S.C. S 1331 gives federal courts "the authority to choose among
available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,374
(1983).
33o 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
331 See Glus, 629 F.2d at 248 (relying on Illinois v. Milwaukee and Lincoln Mills); see also Ash, 496 F.2d
at 421 (relying on Supreme Court decisions including Bivens and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964)). In a dissent toAsh, Judge Aldisert criticized the majority for "defying the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement in" Amtrak, which he read as flashing "bright warning lights" that lower federal courts
should not use excerpts from theJ.I. Case decision tojustify finding "implied civil remedies not expressly
authorized by Congress." 496 F.2d at 426-27. Judge Aldisert clearly read Amtrak accurately. See also
Miller v. Apartments and Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101,107-110 (3d Cir. 1981) (weighing ofvarious
policy considerations to determine whether in 42 U.S.C. S 1988 action co-defendants have right to
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or statutory bases that the Supreme Court identified to justify development
of common law in those cases?3 2 The court of appeals' decisions following
EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., as well as United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 3 34 United States v. Mexico Seed and Feed Co. 335 and
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.336 are the product of that
milieu. In MacMillan Bloedel Containers, the court of appeals decided to
develop federal common law identifying legislative history and text in Title
VII tojustify that action.337
Similarly, in Carolina Transformer the court of appeals concluded that
federal common law should be developed to determine successor liability
issues under CERCLA 338 In doing so, it relied on the prior decision of
United States v. Monsanto33' where the court stated it "must consider
traditional and evolving principles of federal common law, which Congress
has left to the courts to supply interstitially.
" 340
The court of appeals in Mexico Seed and Feed Co. did not even consider
whether it should develop federal common law in order to determine
successor liability under CERCLA. The court merely accepted the parties'
assumptions that federal law should be applied, but ultimately held that there
contribution and type ofcontribution claim available); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095,1101-03 (9th
Cir. 1978) (weighing conflicting policy considerations and determining that under federal common law
it was inappropriate to create remedy of federal court's suspension of license of driver convicted of
drunken driving on federal facility).
332 In Glus, the majority read Illinois v. Milwaukee as standing for the general proposition that "there
is a federal common law" and Lincoln Mills for the proposition that "in some circumstances federal
common law causes of action arise from the interstices of congressional actions." Glus, 629 F.2d at 253.
In her dissent, Judge Sloviter correctly explained how the majority applied the Supreme Court decisions
too broadly. Id. at 260-65. In Ash, the majority never indicated that in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-92, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment gave the federal judiciary the power to create a cause
of action against federal agents. Ash, 496 F.2d at 421.
M3 E.g., Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Serv., 360 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2004) (following
EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.); In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc. 700 F.2d 695, 698 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(same); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Slack v. Havens,
522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).
334 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992).
335 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992).
3 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
337 EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1089-93 (6th Cir. 1974).
3M United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992). See also
Lansford-Coaldalejoint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that
need for uniformity requires use of federal common law to decide when corporate veil should be pierced).
3N 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
No US v. Monsanto Corp., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988).
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was no basis for finding a defendant to be a successor under the substantial
continuity test.34'
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp., the court of appeals did not have to
decide whether state law or federal common law should determine successor
liability issues.342 In fact, the evidence available to the court indicated that the
successor liability issues involved statutory consolidations or mergers and
thus could be decided without use of the substantial continuity test, which
is a creation of the federal courts.3 43 Nevertheless, the court cited with
approval various authorities that advocated the use of federal common law,
and the substantial continuity test, to determine successor liability in
CERCLA cases.3" The court went on to state that in order to determine
successor liability in CERCLA cases, a need for "national uniformity" might
require the use of" [t] he general doctrine of successor liability in operation
in most states ... rather than the excessively narrow statutes which might
apply in only a few states.
" 311
F. The Supreme Court Quashes the Expansive Use of Federal Common Law
In response to the lower courts' expansive use of federal common law,
the Supreme Court took steps in three types of cases to limit development
of court-made rules based on policy analysis. First, the Court made legislative
intent, as opposed to an analysis of statutory policies, the determinative factor
in whether a federal statute creates an implied private cause of action.346
341 Mex. Seed and Feed Co., 980 F.2d at 487 n.9, 489-90.
342 Smith Land & Improvement Corp, 851 F.2d at 87-88. On appeal, the issue in Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. was whether caveat emptor could be asserted as defense to CERCLA action. Id.
However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently treated Smith Land & Improvement Corp. as binding
precedent and required it to apply federal common law when deciding successor liability under CERCLA.
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2005).
343 Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 91.
3" Id. at 91, n.2.
345 Id. at 92.
3 See, e.g., Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981), revg, 595 F.2d 396 (7th
Cir. 1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14-24 (1979), revg sub nom.,
Lewis v. Transamerica Corp. 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1978). In Coutu, 595 F.2d at 396, the Seventh Circuit
relied upon its decision in McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 512 F.2d 583, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1975), reaffd
on remand, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), in which the court of appeals implied from the Davis-Bacon Act
a cause of action on behalf of wage earners because other state remedies had not been effective to protect
their interests. In Lewis, the Ninth Circuit relied on decisions of other Courts of Appeal to conclude that
the Investment Advisors Act provided an implied private action for damages. Lewis, 575 F.2d at 238
(citingWilson v. First Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978) and Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977)). Those decisions used a multi-factor analysis, including consideration of
statutory policies, to find that the Investment Advisers Act provided an implied private action for damages.
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Secondly, the Supreme Court decided that legislative intent and a
presumption against congressional creation of a right to contribution, and not
weighing of policies, should be used to determine whether a federal statute
provides to a liable party a contribution action against other alleged violators
of the statute.347 Finally, the Supreme Court began to apply a presumption
that Congress intended to use long-existing law, including state law, to fill
the interstices of a federal statute where a conflicting congressional intent or
specific statutory policy was lacking.348 The Besfoods' decision falls within the
third category of the Supreme Court's efforts to curb the federal courts'
development of federal common law.
With these decisions, the Supreme Court reduced the situations in which
it was possible to use federal common law analysis. By doing so, the Court
sought to reduce separation of powers and federalism concerns by restraining
the lower federal courts' development of federal common law.
In The Scope of Federal Common Law, Professor Field criticized the
Supreme Court's curtailment of federal common law analysis in the cases of
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries.349 She suggested that judicial restraint
in using common law analysis was enough to curb excesses. 3' However, in
Bestfoods the Supreme Court continued to curtail the use of common law
analysis. Only in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machainm35 does the Court plead forjudicial
restraint rather than adopt a legal rule that would preclude the use of
common law analysis. Perhaps concerns other than separation of powers and
federalism lead the Supreme Court to disfavor common law analysis.
See Wilson, 566 F.2d at 1238-43; Abrahamson,, 568 F.2d at 872-79. See also Touche & Ross Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), rvg, 592 F.2d 617, 621-23 (2d Cir. 1978) (Second Circuit found that
Section 17 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided implied action for damages because Act imposed
a duty upon accountants to brokers' customers, and that private action would further the legislative policy
of protecting those customers.) See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) rev'g 496 F.2d 416, 418-19, 421,
423-24 (3d Cir. 1974) (Third Circuit used common law analysis to determine whether federal statute,
prohibiting corporate campaign contributions, provided implied cause of action).
3 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 638-46 (1981). In Tex. Indus., Inc.,
the Court proclaimed that the Anti-trust statutes' text and legislative history did not authorize courts to
create a contribution action in anti-trust matters - that contribution in anti-trust actions is "a matter for
Congress, not the courts, to resolve." Id. See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 91-99 (1981) (noting that whether Title VII and Equal Pay Act allowed contribution actions
was a question of congressional intent, and not an area where development of federal common law was
justified).
3" See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1994); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1991); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,335-36 (1983).
349 Field, supra note 315, at 883.
350 Id. at 888-90 nn.24-29.
351 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
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In Texas Industries, the Court's discussion of the conflicting policy
considerations for and against an implied right of contribution in anti-trust
cases suggests institutional concerns that may have prompted the Supreme
Court's efforts to curtail the use of common law analysis. 52 Scholars and
parties took opposing sides on the issue, each offering reasons why an
implied right of contribution would, or would not, further the policies
underlying the anti-trust statutes.31 Ultimately, even the courts of appeals
found themselves in opposition on the issue.as
By its nature, common law analysis inevitably leads to such disagree-
ments within a court system with twelve regional circuits and in which error
by a lower court is not likely to result in the Supreme Court's exercising its
discretionary authority to accept a case for review.as If common law analysis
is used to fill the gaps of federal statutes, a party simply has to identify some
policy and then persuade ajudge, and on appeal, two or three more judges,
that the policy justifies a decisional rule, which is presumably favorable to
that party. For an intercircuit conflict to develop subsequently, another party
simply has to identify other policy reasons that justify a different rule and
convince thejudges in one of the other eleven circuits to adopt the different
rule or to modify the first court's rule. This is a serious problem in our
federal court system where there are twelve intermediate appellate courts,
each of whose decisions are the law of its respective circuits until reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Depending on the creativity of attorneys and the
352 Tex. Indus, 451 U.S. at 634-38.
353 Id. at 631, 635 n.6. At least nine parties filed amicus briefs urging affirmance or reversal. Id.
at 631. There were four other amicus briefs. Id. The Supreme Court cited twelve law review articles
discussing the issue of right of contribution in anti-trust actions. Id. at 635, n.6. In Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739
(2004), scholars and others filed nineteen amicus briefs on the merits. See Brief of Professors of Federal
Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004
Westlaw 419425 (Feb. 27, 2004) (Nos. 03-339, 03-485). See also Appellate Brief for Respondent, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), 2004 Westlaw 419421-29; BriefofAmici Curiae International
Jurist in Support ofAffirmance, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2004 Westlaw 398960-64; Brief
for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2004 Westlaw 199236; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2004 Westlaw 177035-36; Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation, National Fraternal Order of Police, and Allied Educational Foundation
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2004 Westlaw
162759-61.
354 Tex. Indus. 451 U.S. at 632, n.1.
355 See Sup. Ct. R. 10 & 10(a,c) (Supreme Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari "only
for compelling reasons" including, inter alia, when a "United States court of appeals has entered a decision
in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter," but
a petition "is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of... misapplication of a properly stated rule
of law.")
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predilections ofjudges, a party may be subject in the twelve circuits to two
or more different decisional rules, each derived through common law
analysis.
Unfortunately, this is more than a simple hypothetical concern to be
discussed in a scholarly atmosphere. In the matters reviewed in Kimbell
Foods, two U.S. District Courts, and different panels of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, used at least three different federal common law rules to
determine the priority of security interests of the FHA and SBA versus
private parties' interests. In fact, the Fifth Circuit identified, but rejected,
two other common law rules.
3 56
There currently exists an intercircuit conflict involving Title VII claims.
The courts of appeal have developed three different decisional rules using
common law analysis, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has declined
to use such an analysis in light of Bestfoods. As such, there is in fact a four-
way intercircuit conflict.
The current intercircuit conflict involves the decisional rule to determine
when related corporations should be treated as one employer for the
purposes of Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. That
issue is decisive in cases because if a corporation is an employer and has less
than the prerequisite number of employees, then it is not subject to an
enforcement proceeding or a private suit by an employee under the statutes.
The majority of circuit courts have applied or adopted the "four-factor
integrated enterprise test" to determine when related corporations should be
treated as one employer for the purposes of Title VII or other federal anti-
discrimination statutes.357 Many of those courts borrowed the integrated
enterprise test, developed for use in NLRB proceedings, without considering
how the test would further Title VII policies or accepted parties' assumption
that the test applied.35
3% In the case involving the SBA's security interest, the Texas District Court applied the federal
choate lien test and state law alternatively, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit selected a federal common law
rule, based on the U.C.C. principle of first-in-time, first-in-right, after surveying three possible rules.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 721-23 (1979). In the case involving the FHA, the
Georgia District Court identified various grounds under state and federal law for finding that the FHA's
security interest was not superior, and the Fifth Circuit developed federal common law based on the
Model U.C.C. and the Tax Lien Act of 1966. Id. at 724-25.
357 See e.g., Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 664-66 (1st Cir. 2000) (supporting Title VII
treatment); Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc. 69 F3d 1235,1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Hukill v. Auto
Care, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 1999) (supporting treatment under Family and Medical Leave
Act); Childs v. Local 18, IBEW, 719 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983) (supporting Title VII treatment);
McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); Trevino
v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 403-04 (1983) (same).
358 See, e.g., Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) (accepting
parties' argument that test applied); Arrowsmith Shdburne, 69 F.3d at 1241-42 (following other Circuit
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The four prongs of the integrated enterprise test are: (1) interrelation of
operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common
management, and (4) common ownership or financial control. 3 9 Among the
courts of appeal that have used the test, there is a conflict over what
constitutes sufficient control over labor operations to justify a finding that
related corporations are one employer. The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts
have held that "'a parent's broad general policy statements regarding
employment matters are not enough'" and that "'to satisfy the control prong,
a parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the
subsidiary. '' 360 According to those circuit courts, this "stringent requirement
of inter-relatedness is based on the corporate law principle of limited
liability."
361
Conversely, the First, Second, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
taken a more flexible approach that focuses on employment decisions. To
each of those circuit courts, the ultimate question is whether a parent
corporation "exerts [over those decisions] 'an amount of participation that
is sufficient and necessary to the total employment process, even absent total
control or ultimate authority over hiring decisions.'"362 Under this approach,
there is sufficient evidence to hold a parent corporation liable under Title VII
if the parent corporation's management influenced a subsidiary's decisions
to dismiss a new employee because of her sex and there was other evidence
of inter-relatedness between the affiliates.3 3
Courts); McKenzie, 834 F.2d at 932-34 (following other courts); Trevino, 701 F.2d at 403-405 (finding it
appropriate to adopt NLRB enterprise test because of courts' use of that rule and other NLRB rules in
-, Title VII cases); Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 637 F.2d 24,26-27 (1st Cir. 1980) (acknowledging
that the enterprise test is the rule that is most consistent with liberal treatment of the definition of
employer under Title VII).
359 E.g. Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Bookstores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993-94 (6th Cir. 1997);
McKenzie, 834 F.2d at 933; Trevino, 701 F.2d at 404.
M6 Romano, 233 F.3d at 666 (discussing different views of Courts of Appeal on breadth to give
integrated enterprise test in Title VII case), quoting Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1070 (10th
Cir. 1998); Luskv. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997).
361 Romano, 233 F.3d at 666 (citing Lusk, 129 F.3d at 777 n.3, 778). See also Frank v. U.S. West,
Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993).
M E.g. Romano, 233 F.3d at 666 (followingAnowsmith Shelburne, 69 F.3d at 1240-41); Armbruster
v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1338 (6th Cir. 1983).
3W Romano, 233 F.3d at 660-61, 667-68. In Arrowsmith Shelburne., 69 F.3d at 1237-38, the court
held that treatment of parent and subsidiary as one employer may be appropriate when there was evidence
that parent's general manager made discriminatory statements about women employees and he targeted
plaintiff, subsidiary's female employee, for dismissal. InArrowsmith Shelburne, evidence ofinterrelatedness
included that employment applications went through parent, parent approved personnel status reports
of subsidiary, subsidiary cleared with parent major personnel decisions, plaintiffwas hired at direction of
parent's vice president for human resources and fired at direction of parent's general manager, and the
affiliates had common management and common offices. Arrowsmith Shelburne, 69 F.3d at 1241.
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In Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc.,364 the Third Circuit declined to adopt
either the integrated enterprise test or the Bestfoods analysis to decide whether
affiliated corporations should be treated as a single employer under Title
VII.36 Instead, that court considered "Title ViI's policy goals" and
determined that affiliated corporations should be treated as one employer
when: (i) the corporations were split into separate organizations to avoid
Title VII coverage, (ii) the parent directed the subsidiary to perform alleged
discriminatory action, or (iii) under the bankruptcy concept of substantive
consolidation, the affiliates should be treated as one entity. 3' The court
acknowledged that in adopting a modified substantive consolidation rule for
Title VII cases, it was creating "an intentionally, open-ended, equitable
inquiry... of federal common law." 367
Similarly, federal courts have identified state law, the integrated
enterprise test, and the federal Labor Department's "DOL factors test" as
three possible sources for resolving issues relating to piercing the corporate
veil under the Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act.36
To pick the appropriate test, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals resorted to
common law analysis, selecting the "DOL factors test" because it was
"created with WARN Act policies in mind."369
Before Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, a different
institutional issue appears to have occurred as a result of the federal courts'
methods for addressing contribution and indemnity claims against unions in
Title VII cases. Those claims were asserted in Title VII litigation as a result
of collective bargaining agreement provisions, which allegedly discriminated
against either men or women.37 In all of those cases, individual employees
3M 347 F.3d 72 (3rd Cir. 2003).
M Nesbit, 347 F. 3d at 84-86 (rejecting both the use of the integrated enterprise test and the
utilization of Bes0foods analysis).
W Id. at 85-87. See also cases cited supra note 314.
367 Id. at 87.
W See Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471,484-89 (3d Cir. 2001).
369 Id. at 490.
370 Stevenson v. Int'l Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 392-94 (W.D. La. 1977) (considering claims
of gender discrimination with union co-defendant); Int'l Union of Elect., Radio and Mach. Workers v.
Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57, 58-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (considering gender discrimination
claims by union plaintiff); Grogg v. Gen. Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523, 526-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(considering gender discrimination claims by union plaintiff); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78,
80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (considering gender discrimination claim by male employees and union plaintiff);
Gilbert v. Gen. Elect. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 269-71 (E.D. Va. 1973) (considering gender discrimination
claims by union plaintiff); Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 51 F.R.D. 517, 518-19 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
(considering gender discrimination claim with union defendant); Blanton v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49
F.R.D. 162,163-64 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (considering gender discrimination claims by union plaintiff); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 335-36 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (considering gender discrimination
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and unions were co-plaintiffs against an employer, the union and employer
were co-defendants, or the union was a third-party defendant.3 7' Numerous
U.S. District Courts dealt with the contribution claims by summarily
accepting that they were allowed or by considering their resolution a
question of fact.372
By not addressing at an early stage whether the claims were allowed
under Title VII, those district courts made resolutions of the cases more
complicated in two ways. In cases in which a union was only a plaintiff, the
claims added an additional issue that potentially had to be resolved by a trial
between the employer and union. In cases in which a union was a co-
defendant, the claims potentially required the union's participation in
litigation until the employer and union resolved all claims against them,
rather than allowing the union's dismissal after it reached a settlement with
members of a collective bargaining unit. In both situations, the lower courts'
means of dealing with the claims had a potential for increasing workload.
In Northwest Airlines, the Supreme Court's rule addressed this
institutional issue by putting on the party asserting a contribution or
indemnity claim the burden of establishing, via statutory text and legislative
history, congressional intent, a question of law. The rule made it more likely
that federal courts may resolve the issue at an early stage as the result of a
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and more likely that federal
appellate courts will have an opportunity to review that resolution.
There may be societal and institutional concerns unrelated to the
operation of the federal courts that lead the Supreme Court to focus upon
congressional intent. By limitingjudicial discretion to develop common law
rules, the Supreme Court not only addresses separation of power and
federalism concerns, but also articulates a decisional rule that promotes
predictability of the use of federal common law. After Clear feld Trust and
Lincoln Mills, Judge Friendly was enthusiastic about the potential of federal
common law, but he nevertheless expressed concern that in Cleatfield Trust
the Supreme Court "jumped [over] rather quickly and not altogether
convincingly, [the issue of] whether, having [an] opportunity, the federal
courts should adopt a uniform nationwide rule." 3 Other enthusiastic
claims with union defendant), affd in part and rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). In Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77,84 n.11 (1981), the Supreme Court identified these and
other lower federal court decisions as supporting the conclusion that as to an award of back pay Title VII
provided an employer with a right of contribution against a union.
371 See cases cited supra note 328.
372 See, e.g., Stevenson, 432 F. Supp at 407-09; Int'l Union, 73 F.R.D. at 59, Grogg, 72 F.R.D. at 528;
Lynch, 62 F.R.D. at 89-90; Gilbert, 59 F.R.D. at 270-71; Torockio, 51 F.R.D. at 519; Blanton, 49 F.R.D. at
164; Bowe, 272 F. Supp. at 357-58.
3 Friendly, supra note 74, at 183.
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commentators recognized that the two-step decisional rule of Clearfield Trust
potentially gave judges the ability to adopt a uniform federal rule whenever
they believed it to be appropriate.374 Other commentators have noted that it
is generally difficult to predict when federal courts will decide to develop
uniform rules of federal common law:
There are no bright lines delineating the matter on which federal
courts have the power to develop and apply federal common law,
and distinguishing these subjects from those on which Erie requires
that state law be applied. Whether state law or federal law controls
on matters not covered by the Constitution or an Act of Congress is
a very complicated question, one that does not yield to any simple
answer in terms of the parties to the suit, the basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction, or the source of the right that is to be enforced.
... To some extent, each exercise of federal common lawmaking
is sui generis in that it is the product of the unique interplay of
specific statutory or constitutional language, case-sensitive policy
concerns, and other case-specific factors.37
Predictability is perhaps the most important societal aspect of our legal
system because it allows for parties to accurately determine their rights in,
and the legal consequences of, a myriad of circumstances. 376 Additionally,
predictability may help to assure public confidence in the judiciary, which
provides the federal courts with the persuasive authority on which they
depend for enforcement of their decisions. Therefore, to the extent that the
Supreme Court in Bestfoods and other cases articulates rules that promote
predictability, the rules further this societal and institutional interest.
While institutional concerns may be at work in Besfoods, Texas Industries
and Northwest Airlines, nothing suggests that they were predominant in
effecting the Supreme Court's decisions. By their nature, unstated
institutional concerns must have limited effect because the Supreme Court,
374 Field, supra note 315, at 887, 944.
375 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4514 (1996).
376 See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 622-24 (2004). In this 2003 Term decision,
the Supreme Court held that a police officer may undertake the warrantless search of an automobile
recently occupied by a criminal suspect who is arrested although first contact between the officer and
suspect occurred after the suspect exited the vehicle. Id. at 622-24. The Courtjustified its decision in part
because it sought to articulate "a bright-line rule" that police could apply easily in a situation where there
safety is at risk. Id. In a dissent, Justice Stevens complained that the majority opinion did not articulate
a "bright-line rule" that allowed police to determine the extent of their search authority in a recurring
situation. Id. at 636 (Stevens, J.,joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
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lower federal courts, and parties cannot invoke them asjustification for their
respective decisions and arguments. Certainly, separation of power and
federalism concerns are enough to support the Bestfoods presumption of the
use of state law because it designates Congress as the primary decision-maker
on whether federal statutes should override state law. Likewise, separation
of power concerns are sufficient to justify the rule of Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries. By maintaining a long-standing presumption that federal
statutes do not provide a right of contribution, the rule assigns to Congress,
rather than to the federal courts, the decision of whether to create a statutory
right to contribution.
At the time of the decisions in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the
states' legislatures had been working diligently to develop the law of
contribution within their respective jurisdictions. In at least one instance
Congress stepped in and explicitly provided specifically for a uniform right
of contribution.377 Therefore, creation of a right to contribution under
individual statutes or via a general contribution statute, was arguably a
question that should be left to Congress because it was aware of the issue and
could act upon it.
3 78
Similarly, in the Supreme Court decisions involving the issue of federal
statutes providing implied private actions, lower courts were very willing to
find the existence of a private right of action,379 and as to federal securities
M See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88, n.17 (1981) (identifying 30
states that created right of contribution by statute and four states where legislatures adopted contribution
statutes after judiciary recognized right of contribution). The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws originally promulgated the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
("UCTFA") in 1939, and at least eight states subsequently adopted legislation conforming substantially
to the 1939 version of the Uniform Act. 12 U.LA 187-88 (1996). At least eleven states adopted the
revised UCTFA promulgated in 1955, and nine of those states did so by 1978. 12 U.LA at 185. See also
Clean Water Act, Section 311 (g-h), 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (g-h), added by Public Law 92-500, 86 Stat. 862 (Oct.
18, 1972) (providing right of contribution).
378 Congress has not ignored the presumption, or the presumption is consistentwith congressional
practice before Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries. In legislation enacted subsequent to the decisions
in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, Congress has provided for a right to contribution and clarified
whether it intended to create a right to contribution as part of a statutory scheme. See Securities and
Exchange Act, Section 4f, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(0(5-9), added by Public Law 105-353, 112 Stat. 3233 (Nov. 3,
1998) and Public Law 104-67, 109 Stat. 743 (Dec. 22, 1995); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Section 1009, 33
U.S.C. S 2709; CERCLA Section 113(0, 42 U.S.C. S 9613(0, added by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986). In at least one instance
before the 1980 Term, Congress indicated an intent to create a right of contribution. See Clean Water Act,
Section 311(g-h), 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (g-h), added by Public Law 92-500,86 Stat. 862 (Oct. 18,1972).
37n See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 626, 627 n.14, 629-32 (7th Cir.
1980); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Potomac Passengers
Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See also Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d at 426-27
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statutes at least one court of appeals was willing to presume the existence of
an implied action absent congressional intent to the contrary.3 ° Such a
willingness created separation of powers concerns because the lower courts,
and not Congress, had made themselves the decision-makers concerning
what federal statutes should provide private causes of action.
Only in Sosa are institutional concerns stated, at least by Justice Scalia,
with whom the late ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomasjoin. Their
concurrence makes it clear that they do not trust the lower courts to exercise
judicial restraint in developing federal common law based upon the law of
nations.381 The interaction of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal,
which culminated in decisions including Universities Research Association v.
Coutu, 382 Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,383 Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,314 Cannon v. University of Chicagoo, 385 Northwest Airlines, and Texas
Industries may explain why the minority explicitly raises institutional
concerns. Before Touche Ross & Co. and Cannon, the Supreme Court used a
multi-pronged test and common law weighing of policies to determine
whether a federal statute provided an implied private cause of action, but the
Court urged lower federal courts to exercise judicial restraint in finding
implied actions.3s6 The lower federal courts did not heed that admonition.
In response, the Court in Touche Ross & Co. and Cannon eliminated the lower
federal courts' discretion by making congressional intent the key issue that
determines whether a statute provides an implied private right of action.3"
In Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, two cases on which Justice Scalia
relied in Sosa, the Court extended Touche Ross & Co. and Cannon and held
that congressional intent, and not a weighing of policies, should determine
(Aldisert,J., dissenting) (criticizing court of appeals majority for not following Supreme Court's decision
in Amtrak).
W In connection with finding that the Investment Advisors Act provided an implied private action
for damages, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Abrahamson v. Fleschner stated that it would find the
Act provided an implied action "absent clear evidence ... that private actions were not intended" by
Congress. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court found that the Act
provided an implied private action even though from the legislative history it was "clear that Congress
simply did not consider the matter." Id. at 875.
381 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2774-76 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
38 450 U.S. 754 (1981).
3M 444 U.S. 11, 14-24 (1979).
3N 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
3 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
3M6 See e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
3V See supra notes 323-334 and accompanying text.
38 See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
424 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:359
whether a federal statute provides an implied right to contribution. 8 9 In light
of Touche Ross & Co., Cannon, Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, it is
apparent thatJustice Scalia, ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas view
the Sosa majority's invocation ofjudicial restraint as an effort that failed in
the past and is not likely to succeed now.
By invoking institutional concerns, the minority also puts the lower
courts on notice that the future of Sosa depends on their actions. Three
justices do not trust the lower federal courts to exercise judicial restraint in
developing federal common law pursuant to Sosa. If the federal courts do not
restrain themselves, there is a serious threat that other justices will join the
trio and abandon the Sosa experimentjust as the Court discarded the multi-
prong test of Cort v. Ash.3"
1. THE FUTURE OF CAROLiNA TRANSFORMER, MEmCO FEED AND SEED,
SMFH LAND AND GENERAL BATTERY
The Supreme Court in Bestfoods established that when determining
corporate liability under CERCLA, a presumption of congressional intent
should be applied absent evidence to the contrary.3 91 The presumption is that
Congress intended reference to state law to decide issues such as piercing the
corporate veil and successor liability.3 2 It is generally accepted that Congress
authorized federal courts to develop federal common law for determining
joint and several liability under CERCLA.393 However, it does not follow as
a matter of logic, statutory interpretation, or legislative history that Congress
gave the federal judiciary general authorization to develop federal common
law that fills all of the interstices of CERCLA. The text of CERCLA
supports a contrary conclusion because amendments to the Act specifically
state when the federal judiciary was to develop federal law relating to
M See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
390 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
391 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62-63 (1998).
392 Id.
393 United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 & n.23 (4th Cir. 1988). But see Anspec Co. v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
legislative history indicates congressional intent that federal courts should apply existing state law ofjoint
and several liability).
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CERCLA,39 4 and in other instances, the Act provides that state law should
govern issues.
395
Additionally, the First Circuit in United States v. Davis, and the Ninth
Circuit in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., which
respectively follow the Supreme Court's decisions in Bes Foods and Atherton,
may foreclose the conclusion that statutory text, legislative history, or specific
policies of CERCLAjustify displacement of state law with federal law. To
the contrary, the courts of appeal do not find in CERCLA any statutory text,
legislative history, or specific policies that require such displacement.396
Therefore, the presumptive use of state law should apply when deciding
successor liability in CERCLA cases.
The Bestfoods decision requires the identification of statutory text,
legislative history, or specific statutory policy to overcome the presumption
that state law should be used to fill the interstices of federal statutes
addressing issues such as corporate liability. To date, no court has identified
any such text, history, or specific policy in CERCLA. Therefore, state law
should be used to determine corporate liability issues, including successor
liability, in CERCLA matters. Because Carolina Transformer Co., Mexico Feed
and Seed Co., and Smith Land &Improvement did not use the Bestfoods approach
and concluded summarily that federal common law should decide such
issues, the decisions cannot remain good law. Their viability is especially
questionable to the extent that they rely on a need for uniformity as a
rationale for development of federal common law because the Supreme
Court in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC unanimously warned lower federal
courts against use of "uniformity" to justify use of federal common law.397
394 In CERCLA Section 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. S 9613(0(1), Congress stated specifically, as to
contribution actions brought during or after actions pursuant to Sections 106 or 107(a), 42 U.S.C. SS
9606, 9607(a), that the "claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law." 42 U.S.C. S 9613(f)(1), added by Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 198 Public Law 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986).
1% CERCLA Section 107(e), 42 U.S.C. S 9607(e), provides that the statute does not displace
conveyances or indemnification and hold harmless agreements that assign liability under CERCLA, or
subrogation rights existing under state law, except that the agreements cannot extinguish a person's
liability under CERCLA.
39 See United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (claiming Besfoods confirmed the
court of appeals' view that state law should govern successor liability in CERCLA cases.); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 132 F.3d 1295, 1298-1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that in light of Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997) state law, and not distinct federal common law,
should decide successor liability under CERCLA (overruling La.-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260
(1990)). But see NewYork v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 685-87 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, C.J.)
(In light ofBesofoods, B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski is overruled, but federal common law, not state law, governs
scope of successor liability under CERCLA).
3n In O'Melveny &Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), the Supreme Court described "uniformity"
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Other federal court decisions, which decide summarily that uniformity
requires use of federal common law in CERCLA matters, also cannot remain
good law.
398
The majority in United States v. General Battery Corp.99 defends Smith
Land & Improvement despite the decisions of Bestfoods and O'Melveny & Myers.
According to the majority, the Supreme Court decisions are not contrary to
the Third Circuit's statement in Smith Land & Improvement that a need for
uniformity justifies the development of federal common law to decide
successor liability under CERCLA.4° In doing so, the majority maintained
that the states' law of successor liability is "unsettled," and there are
significant differences in the rules of successor liability from state to state.4°1
According to the Third Circuit majority, "[s]tate law does vary
substantially on the issue of successor liability, and its unpredictability
counsels in favor of CERCLA uniformity."' Additionally, in the General
Battery majority's view, "[a] more uniform and predictable federal liability
standard corresponds with specific CERCLA objectives by encouraging
settlements and facilitating a more liquid market in corporate and
'brownfield' assets."4 °3 At one point, the majority states that variable state
successor liability standards would conflict with the CERCLA policies of
encouraging early settlements and facilitating a liquid market in brownfields
by "increas [ing] significantly CERCLA litigation and transaction costs."
4
The General Battery majority did not consider whether there was a
"conflict" between the Pennsylvania law of successor liability and specific
policies of CERCLA.4 5 Rather, it found a conflict "because CERCLA's goal
as the "most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests." Id. at 88. The Court went on to
state that uniformity justifies development of federal common law only when the "rules of decision at
issue... govern the primary conduct of the United States, or any of its agents or contractors." Id.
Furthermore, the Court stated as to rules that affected FDIC's ability to recover in litigation because of
private entities' past actions: "Uniformity of law might facilitate the FDIC's nationwide litigation...
eliminating state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty - but if the avoidance of those ordinary
consequences qualified as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in 'federal common-law'
rules." Id.
398 See, e.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir.
1993).
399 423 F.3d 294, 299-301 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Besrfoods and O'Melveny & Myers).
400 Id.
401 Id. at 301-03.
4 Id. at 301-02.
4M Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added).
04 Id. at 303.
4o Id.
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of minimizing litigation and transaction costs is ill-served by a case-by-case
approach to the question of successor liability choice-of-law."
4°6
The Supreme Court's decisions, including O'Melveny & Meyers and
Atherton, cannot be disregarded so easily. As Judge Rendell puts it in her
minority opinion,
To say that the need for uniformity is the articulated federal policy
supplying the rationale for creating federal common law is to put the
analytic rabbit in the hat, so to speak. If uniform application is
indeed the goal, resort would never be had to state law assuming
some variation as among the different laws. Uniformity cannot be,
and has never been said to be, the single animating principle.... [I]t
is [not] a .. .goal .. .that has served as the basis on which the
Supreme Court, or any other court of appeals to have addressed the
issue, has rejected the application of state law. Rather, as discussed
above and made clear in O'Melveny and Atherton, those courts that
have considered rejecting the application of a particular state law in
favor of a federal scheme have done so only when the state law in
question clearly conflicted with an important federal policy to be
advanced....
The Kimbell Foods test details three considerations relevant to the
determination of whether federal common law or state law should
provide the rule of decision: 1) whether the nature of the federal
program requires national uniformity; 2) whether the application of
state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program;
and 3) whether the application of federal law would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law.
... [I]t is the second factor of the Kimbell Foods test which should
receive paramount consideration. The Supreme Court in O'Melveny
and Atherton cite to the Kimbell Foods test in direct support of the
precept that "when courts decide to fashion rules of federal common
law, 'the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law ... must first be
specifically shown.' Indeed, such a 'conflict' is normally a
'precondition. ' °
4 Id.
Id. at 317 n.18 (citations omitted) (Rendell, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part)
(citing Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997).
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In General Battery, a majority of the Third Circuit panel states an
alternative rationale for holding that uniform federal common law rules
should decide successor liability under CERCLA. They suggest that the
determination of a corporation's successors constitutes statutory interpreta-
tion, and under recent Supreme Court precedent, generally accepted
common law rules should be applied to decide the scope of a statutory
term.4°8 This alternative rationale is based on the premise that by adopting
1 U.S.C. Section 5409 in 1947, Congress intended the terms "corporation,"
"company," and "association," to include "successors" and that "successors"
becomes an undefined term of statutes that use those three terms.
This rationale is problematic. First, successor liability is normally treated
as an issue of common law, not as an issue of interpreting the term
"corporation." Despite 1 U.S.C. § 5, federal courts have uniformly treated
successor liability under federal statutes as an issue of common law.410
Further, nothing in the language of 1 U.S.C. § 5 indicates a congressional
intent to make "successor" an undefined term of other statutes with the
terms "corporation," "company," or "association," and there is no reason to
give a statute enacted as an interpretative rule such an effect. Third, the
rationale involves a significant extension of the rule in Clackamas
Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,41' and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,412
without any argument or authority that the Supreme Court would approve
the rule's application in the successor liability context. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, when the Third Circuit relied upon Clackamas
Gastroenterology and Burlington Industries in General Battery, it ignored the
fundamental distinction between Bestfoods and Burlington Industries and
Clackamas Gastroenterology. In the cases of Clackamas Gastroenterology and
Burlington Industries, there existed an explicit statutory term without a
definition and an explicit term with a circular and meaningless definition,
40 Id. at 304-05 (citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003)
and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998)).
4W The provision states that "'company' or 'association', when used in reference to a corporation,
shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such company or association.'" 1 U.S.C.
S 5 (2000).
410 See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Serv., 360 F.3d 173, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing cases); United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 52-55 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing successor liability
under CERCLA); Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 132 F.3d 1295, 1298-99 (9th
Cir. 1997) (successor liability under CERCLA); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc. 503 F.2d
1086, 1089-92 (6th Cir. 1974) (discussing successor liability under Title VII). In her concurring opinion
in General Battery, Judge Rendell criticized this alternative rationale, as well as the majority's adoption of
the alternative rationale, which was not addressed by the parties. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d at 311, n. 14.
411 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
412 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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respectively.413 By adopting the rule that such statutory terms should be
interpreted using general common law principles, the Supreme Court
provides a rule of interpretation that avoids separation of power issues
because thejudiciary is not performing the legislative role of defining a term
in light of statutory policies or purposes.414 Additionally, the rule puts
Congress on notice that if it intends a statutory term with a generally
accepted legal meaning to have a different meaning, the legislature must
supply a definition.
The situation in Bestfoods is quite different. CERCLA does not attempt
to define the term "successor," and the statute and legislative history provide
no clear indication as to how Congress intended thejudiciary to decide issues
such as parent-subsidiary liability and successor liability.41s That situation
involves separation of powers issues because thejudiciary must provide a rule
of law to fill a statutory gap without additional guidance from Congress. It
also involves federalism concerns because the federal judiciary must provide
law in an area where the states have traditionally enjoyed sovereignty. The
Supreme Court in Bestfoods decided that the federalism concerns require the
federal judiciary to defer in most instances to a state's law. Additionally, the
Supreme Court decided that the separation of powers concerns require the
federal judiciary to defer in most cases to Congress by not making policy
decisions best left to the representative branch of government.
In General Battery, the resolution of the corporate successor issue involved
federalism concerns rather than simply presenting a separation of powers
issue. Therefore, the Supreme Court's rationale in Bestfoods, not that of
Clackamas Gastroenterology and Burlington Industries, is the most applicable in
General Battery. The Third Circuit appears to recognize the problems with
the application of the Clackamas Gastroenterology and Burlington Industries
rationales, but the panel attempts to minimize the problems by reading
Besfoods as applying general rules of corporate law rather than using a specific
state's law. 416 In her concurring opinion, Judge Rendell points out that this
reading of Besttoods clearly cannot be reconciled with the Besgfoods Court's
413 See Clackamas Gastente0logy, 538 U.S. at 444-46 (determining meaning of undefined term
"agent", part of the statutory definition of "employer"); Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 754-55
(determining meaning of term "employee", defined as "an individual employed by an employer").
414 See Clackamas Gastroenterology, 538 U.S. at 446-47 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
approach, which read the definition of "employee" broadly to fulfill Americans with Disabilities Act's
purpose of"ridding the Nation of the evil of discrimination." See also discussion of EEOC v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc. and Clackamas Gastroenterology, infra, at notes 433-41 and accompanying text.
415 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. S 9601
(2000) (definitions). See also discussion ofCERCLA's provisions and legislative historysupra notes 393-97
and accompanying text.
416 United States v. General Battery Corp. Inc., 423 F.3d. 294,305 (3d Cir. 2005).
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affirming the court of appeals application of Michigan law and the Supreme
Court's admonition that "CERCLA is thus like many another congressional
enactment in giving no indication 'that the entire corpus of state corporation
law is to be replaced simply because the plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon our federal statute.'
4 17
In short, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Atchison, T. &
Santa Fe, Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc.," and the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Davis419 present a convincing analysis of Supreme Court
precedent, which leads to the conclusion that state law should be used to
decide successor liability issues under CERCIA. The majority in General
Battery does not present any convincing argument that Smith Land &
Development is viable law in the face of those Supreme Court decisions.
Therefore, General Battery is not likely to survive any Supreme Court review
to resolve this intercircuit conflict.
2. FuTuRE OFMACM-LLANBLOEDEL CONTANERS AND BRzozowsKI
In light of Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino and
Besfoods,42° the decision in EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc. appears
to have been overruled. In MacMillan Bloedel Containers, the court examined
the statutory text and legislative history of Title VII to find polices that would
allow it to determine that the substantial continuity test should be used to fill
the interstices of Title VII. This is the type of common law analysis that the
courts of appeal used in cases including Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co.,42 1 Wilson P.
Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc.," Professional Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,423 and Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.424 The
Supreme Court rejected the use of that same common law analysis in
decisions including Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,425 Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,426 and Miree v. DeKalb County.427
417 Id. at 312.
418 132 F.3d 1295, 1299-1302 (9th Cir. 1997).
419 261 F.3d 1, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2001).
420 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104 (1991).
421 629 F.2d 248,252-54 (3d Cir. 1980).
42 604 F.2d 897, 900-06 (5th Cir. 1979).
423 594 F.2d 1179, 1182-86 (8th Cir. 1979).
424 504 F.2d 400,402-04 (7th Cir. 1974).
425 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
426 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
427 433 U.S. 25,31-33 (1977).
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The Supreme Court's decisions in Lincoln Mills and Pilot Life Insurance do
not support the approach of the Sixth Circuit. The Court in MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, and the courts of appeal that have followed it, have not
suggested that a statutory provision of Title VII empowers the federal
judiciary to develop a body of federal common law to be applied in
employment discrimination cases.428 Because Congress has shown that it
will use specific language to give that power to the judiciary, it is anomalous
to think that in the absence of such language, a federal court can interpret
Title VII or other statutes to confer such authority.
42 9
At least one Supreme Court decision concerning the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), shows that the Court disfavors the weighing of
policies approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in MacMillan Bloedel Containers.
4 30
In Clackamas Gastroenterology, the Court considered how to determine
whether a person is an "employee" under the ADA in the face of the statute's
"'nominal definition' that is 'completely circular and explains nothing.'"431
To give meaning to the term "employee," the Supreme Court looked to
general principles of common law and particularly the common law
definition of"servant" in the Restatement (Second) ofAgency.432 In selecting
this approach, the Court rejected the analysis of the Second and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals, which took the view that, as a matter of law,
shareholder-employees of professional corporations must be treated as
employees for the purposes of the ADA, ADEA, and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes.433 The Second and Ninth Circuits adopted their
interpretation of the term employee on the basis that the term should be
defined broadly to further the purpose of ADA, ADEA, Title VII, and other
similar federal statutes "to stamp-out discrimination in various forms.
" 434
428 EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc. 503 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (6th Cir. 1974)
(discussing Title VII). See also Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1996); In
re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 700 F.2d 695, 698 (11th Cir. 1983); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221,
224-25 (10th Cir. 1982); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975).
429 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987). But see Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695-98 (1997) (holding that Congress intended to provide a private action
pursuant to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act for reasons including that Title IX was virtually identical to
Title VI and at the time of Title IX's adoption federal courts had interpreted Title VI to provide an implied
private action).
430 It is important to note that the Macmillan Bloedel Containers decision did not involve the filling
of a interstice in the statute.
43t Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,444 (2003) (quoting Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,323 (1992)).
432 Clackamas Gastroenterology, 538 U.S. at 448-49.
433 Id. at 446-47, rev' Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 271 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2001)
and abrogating Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
434 Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796,797-98 (2d Cir. 1986),followed by Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology
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It therefore stands to reason that MacMillan Bloedel Containers cannot be
considered good law. Additionally, its conclusion cannot stand unless parties
can identify within Title VII either (a) specific statutory text or legislative
history thatjustifies the overriding of a presumption that state law should be
used to fill the statute's interstices, 43' or (b) specific federal interests or
policies that conflict with the state law of successor liability.436 As to Title VII
policies with which traditional rules of successor liability might conflict, the
Ninth Circuit has stated:
Title VII... depends almost entirely upon individual workers --
private attorneys general -- to achieve the deterrent purposes of the
statute.... Congress has armed Title VII plaintiffs with remedies
designed to punish employers who engage in unlawful
discriminatory acts, and to deter future discrimination both by the
defendant and by all other employers.437
A full discussion of Title VII policies, and their potential conflicts with
state rules of successor liability is beyond the scope of this article. However,
resolution of the second issue is likely to turn on whether federal courts find
that the court of appeals in MacMillan Bloedel Containers identified policy
concerns that conflicted with the state law of successor liability or merely
adopted a rule of successor liability that promoted Title VII policies.4 3
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has declined to find a congressional
policy thatjustified the development of uniform federal law to displace state
corporation law.439 Additionally, the Supreme Court has confirmed the
validity of past decisions in which the Court selected state law to fill the
Assocs., 271 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). This rejected approach is similar
to the approach of the Courts of Appeals in United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th
Cir. 1992), United States v. Mex. Seed and Feed Co., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992) and Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
435 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60,62-63 (1998); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,
226-31 (1997).
436 See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110-13 (1991); Papa v. Katy
Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1999).
437 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
4M Compare, e.g., Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 666 (1st Cir. 2000) (adopting broad
version of continuity of enterprise test on basis that it is more consistent with purposes of Title VII) with
Papa, 166 F.3d at 940-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that in addition to situations where piercing the corporate
veil is warranted, other instances may exist where conflict between a state rule and Title VII might require
treatment of parent and subsidiary as one employer under Title VII).
4" See, e.g., Atherton, 519 U.S. at 226-31; Kamen v. Kemper Fin'i Servs. 500 U.S. 90, 107-08
(1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,480-86 (1979).
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interstices of a federal statute." Those decisions create serious doubt about
the Supreme Court's willingness to find in the federal anti-discrimination
statutes a specific policy that justifies displacement of state corporate law
concerning successor and affiliate liability.
Furthermore, if there is no text or legislative history that justifies the
overriding of the presumptive use of state law to determine successor liability
under Title VII, the federal courts cannot disregard, in total, the state law of
successor liability as the Court in MacMillan Bloedel Containers did."' State
law rules should apply in most cases." 2 At best, if it has not been adopted as
state law, perhaps the substantial continuity test may be used to supplement
state law when a victim of discrimination seeks a remedy, such as
reinstatement, and that remedy is possible only by imposing successor
liability upon an asset purchaser that knew of the Title VII claims and hired
substantially all of the seller's employees.443
Resolution of these issues also may depend on whether Congress
intended to place Title VII claimants in a position superior to other creditors
of a bankrupt, insolvent, or financially troubled business. Certainly, the
legislative history cited in MacMillan Bloedel Containers cannot be read as
doing so. The history only states that the relief provision of Title VII
"requires that persons aggrieved by [an] unlawful employment practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination."' Absent evidence of congressional intent to give a
40 In Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98, the Supreme Court cited with approval De Sylva v. Ballantine, 351
U.S. 570 (1956) and Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946). In Ballantine, the
Court held that state law should be applied to determine whether an illegitimate child was a child for the
purposes of the Copyright Act. Ballantine, 351 U.S. at 580-81. In Reconstruction Fin. Corp., the Court held
that Pennsylvania property law should decide what state taxes must be paid on property of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a corporation created by Congress. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 328
U.S. at 208-10. See also Lasker, 441 U.S. at 477 (citing De Sylva v. Ballantine with approval).
441 See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 173, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing
successor liability issue presented by parties, finding successor liability may exist); Id. at 182-86 (Garth,
J., dissenting) (contending no successor liability under substantial continuity doctrine); see also Rojas v.
TK Commc'ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745,750 (5th Cir. 1996) (followingMacMillan Bloedel Containers); In re Nat'l
Airlines, Inc. 700 F.2d 695,698 (11th Cir. 1983); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221,224-25
(10th Cir. 1982) (same); Slackv. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975) (same); Brzozowski v.
Corr. Physician Servs., Civil Action No. 00-2590, slip op. at 2-4 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2001) (noting that
parties appear to have assumed continuity test should be used but disagreed whether asset purchaser was
liable as successor under test.).
442 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 60 (1998); Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan v. Solimino, 501
U.S. 104 (1991); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939-42 (1999) (applying Besyf0ods analysis, rather
than borrowing NLRB rule, to determine whether affiliated corporations should be treated as one
employer under federal discrimination statutes).
443 See EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740,748 (7th Cir. 1994).
44 EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1974) (emphasis added)
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Title VII claim priority over others, a Title VII claimant arguably should face
the same risks as any other unsecured claimant or creditor.
In MacMillan Bloedel Containers, the court of appeals also finds in Title VII
justification for the creation of special federal common law rules because
under the statute federal courts act as courts of equity." The Supreme
Court has held to the contrary, ruling that although federal courts act as
courts of equity in bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Code does not
allow the federal judiciary to create special rules of federal common law that
determine creditors' rights."6 In the absence of a specific Bankruptcy Code
provision or conflict with a specific statutory policy, state law decides their
rights."7
It logically follows that if the conclusion of MacMillan Bloedel Containers
cannot survive, the Third Circuit's decision in Brzozowski must fall as well.
That decision, and the decisions of other federal courts as well, rest upon the
Sixth Circuit's conclusion in MacMillan Bloedel Containers."4
3. TREATMENT OF RELATED CORPORATIONS AS ONE EMPLOYER:
BESTFOODS VERSUS COMMON LAW IN TITLE VII CASES
The analysis of Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n and Besfoods should
extend to other issues arising in Title VII matters. In James Papa v. Kty
Industries, Inc.,449 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Bestods
analysis to determine whether affiliated corporations should be treated as one
(citing H. REP. No. 92-899 (1972)). Absent an indication to the contrary, this language may acknowledge
that there are instances, including the bankruptcy, insolvency, or business failure of an employer in which
a victim of discrimination cannot obtain relief
445 MacMillan Bloedel Containers, 503 F.2d at 1091 ("[T]he courts [, Under Title VII,] were given
broad equitable powers to eliminate discrimination in employment to eradicate present and future effects
of past discrimination.").
W See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000) (holding that absent contrary
provision of Bankruptcy Code or some federal interest that requires a different result, state law determines
substance of creditors' claims); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 52-56 (1979) (holding that state law,
and not federal equitable rule, should determine extent of secured creditor's right to rent and profits from
property on which it holds mortgage).
447 Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20, 24-26; Butner, 440 U.S. at 52-56.
W4 See Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 173, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing successor liability issue presented by parties, finding successor liability may exist); Id. at 182-86
(Garth, J., dissenting) (contending no successor liability, under substantial continuity doctrine); Rojas v.
TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745,750 (5th Cir. 1996) (following MacMillan Bloedel Containers);
In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc. 700 F.2d 695, 698 (11 th Cir. 1983) (same); Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694
F.2d 221, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1975)
(same).
449 449 166 F.3d 937 (1999).
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employer for the purposes of Title VII.45° The Supreme Court's decision in
Astoria Federal Savings & Loan, an ADEA case that is in the Bestfoods line of
decisions, appears to mandate the use of that analysis. 451' Notwithstanding,
courts of appeals ignore Astoria Federal Savings & Loan and Besfoods and use
common law analysis to decide what rules should determine when to treat
related companies as one employer.452 As a result, the Seventh Circuit has
adopted one rule, the Third Circuit a second rule, and other Circuit Courts
ofAppeals have adopted two versions of the continuity of enterprise rule for
determining when related corporations should be treated as one employer
under Title VII.453  Such discrepancy creates a clear intercircuit conflict,
which may give the Supreme Court an opportunity to provide further
guidance on the reach of Bestfoods.
In light of the Supreme Court decisions in Besyfoods and Clackamas
Gastroenterology, it may be appropriate to revisit federal courts' use of common
law analysis, and the rule of substantive consolidation, to determine-
without reference to well-established state law or common law rules-
whether bankruptcy proceedings of affiliated corporations, and the assets and
debts of the affiliates, should be consolidated.454 In Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited,
450 Id. at 939-42.
451 Astoria Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
452 See, e.g., Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 84-89 (3d Cir. 2003); Romano v. U-
Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 664-68 (1st Cir. 2000). In Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 84-89, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals identified and weighed various policies to determine that a test of substantive consolidation
from bankruptcy law, not piercing the corporate veil, should be used to determine if two related
corporations should be treated as one employer. In Romano, 233 F.3d at 664-66, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals accepted that the integrated-enterprise test should be used in Title VII cases to decide when
two related corporations should be considered a single employer. The court then weighed various policies
to identify which of the test's factors is most important in determining whether related companies are a
single employer. Romano, 233 F.3d at 665-68.
453 See Papa, 166 F.3d at 939-42 (applying BesOfoods (Seventh Circuit)); Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86-88
(adopting substantive consolidation test (Third Circuit)); Romano, 233 F.3d at 666-67 (applying broad
continuity of enterprise test (First Circuit)); Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir.
1997) (applying narrow continuity of enterprise test (Fifth Circuit)); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d
1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying narrow continuity of enterprise test (Tenth Circuit)).
454 See, e.g., In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 763-66 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting substantive
consolidation test of Second Circuit); In re Giller, 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992) (using different
three-factor form oftest); Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Assoc., Ltd. 935 F.2d 245,249-52 (1 1th Cir. 1991)
(adopting different two-part test). Compare Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)
(stating a absent contrary provision of the Bankruptcy Code or some federal interest that requires a
different result, state law determines substance of creditors' claims); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48, 52-56 (1979) (contending state law, and not federal equitable rule, should determine extent of secured
creditor's right to rent and profits from property on which it holds mortgage).
In In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 764, the court of appeals stated that the Supreme Court in
Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) "first tacitly approved" the "substantive
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Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this instance of the
federal courts' use of common law analysis, which has resulted in an
intercircuit disagreement.55
It may also be appropriate to revisit the court of appeals decision in
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. Ouimet Corp.,456 in which the court of
appeals held that federal law, without reference to state law, should
determine whether legal separation of affiliated corporations should be
discarded so that they may be found liable to the PBGC under Title IV of
ERISA. Similarly, there are questions about the continued validity of courts
of appeals decisions that did not use a Bestfoods analysis to select a special
federal common law rule to determine alter ego liability in Government
actions for recovery of Medicare overpayments or pursuant to the False
Claims Act.457
Finally, in light of Bestfoods and Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., it is doubtful
that "uniformity" or a promotion of statutory policies justifies the selection
of federal law to decide corporate veil piercing issues that arise under the
Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act as held in
Pearson v. Component Technology Corp.4s8 In Pearson, the court noted the
existence of the Bestfoods and Papa decisions." 9 Nevertheless, the court
invoked the need for uniformity as grounds for applying a Department of
Labor test, rather than state law, to decide veil piercing issues under the
consolidation of two estates." In re Bonham, 313 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added). However, the Supreme
Court in Sampsdl did not purport to establish any federal common law rule and did not use the term
substantive consolidation. The issues in Sampsell were (a) whether an unsecured creditor of an individual
debtor could reach the assets of the debtor's family corporation, which was found to have received the
debtor's assets as result of a fraudulent transfer, and (b) whether under the law of fraudulent transfers, an
unsecured creditor of the corporation received priority over the unsecured creditor of the individual
debtor. Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 218-21. In deciding these issues, the Supreme Court looked to state court
decisions concerning fraudulent transfers. Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 218-21. Additionally, in Sampsell, neither
the Supreme Court nor Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the corporation was a debtor in
bankruptcy. Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 215-19; Imperial Paper & Color Corp. v. Sampsell, 114 F.2d 49,50-52
(1940), ev'd, 313 U.S. 215 (1941). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit described the issue on appeal as
whether under California law the corporation was the debtor's alter ego, and there was justification to
disregard the corporate entity. Sampsell, 114 F.2d at 52 (1941).
455 Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing four or five versions of substantive
consolidation test developed respectively by various bankruptcy courts, First, Second, Eighth, Ninth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits).
456 711 F.2d 1085, 1089, 1091-93 (1st Cir. 1983).
457 See United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (failing to
reach the issue because federal law and Texas law were essentially the same); United States v. Pisani, 646
F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1981) (Objectives of Medicare program required development of special federal rule
of alter ego liability.).
458 247 F.3d 471, 488-89 (3d Cir. 2001).
459 Id. at 489-90.
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WARN Act. 4  The court also justified its selection of federal law on the
grounds that the DOL factors "were created with WARN Act policies in
mind and . . . focus particularly on circumstances relevant to labor
relations."461 While the court expressed concern that use of state law rules
might "permit '[t] he policy underlying a federal statute' to be 'defeated by.
. . an assertion of state power,'" it did not identify any potential conflicts
between state rules of corporate liability and specific WARN Act policies.462
In other words, the Court of Appeals selected a federal rule of law because
it purportedly advanced statutory policies, not because state law conflicted
with the federal statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sosa is significant for its approval of the
federal judiciary's development of federal common law rules to govern
private actions by aliens based upon the law of nations. However, beyond
the realm of international law, its importance is doubtful. For sixty years, the
Court's approval of the development of federal common law has been the
exception, not the rule. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Sosa, and past
4W Id. at 489.
461 Id. at 490.
4, Id. at 489. At first glance, the decision in Pearson seems to ignore the Supreme Court's
admonition that when an administrative agency, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress, interprets
a statute, a federal court must defer to the interpretation unless it "is arbitrary, capricious or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Chevron, U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984). But see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000) (noting that agency
statutory interpretations in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, which are not the result of a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment, do not "warrant
Chevron-style deference" because they "lack the force of law."). On further investigation, it is clear that
the issue ofdeference does not occur in Pearson because, in the rule-making for 20 C.F.R. 693.3(a)(2), the
Department of Labor does not express a view concerning the law that should be used to determine
corporate liability issues under the WARN Act. According to the Department, the intent of the
regulation, concerning whether to treat a subsidiary or independent contractor, and its parent or
contracting company, as one employer, is not to create a special definition of these terms [independent
contractors and subsidiaries] for WARN purposes; the definition is intended only to summarize existing
law that has developed under State Corporations laws and such statutes as the NLRA, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Department
does not believe that there is any reason to attempt to create new law in this area especially for WARN
purposes when relevant concepts of State and federal law adequately cover the issue. Thus, no change
has been made in the definition. Similarly, the regulation is not intended to foreclose any application of
existing law or to identify the source of legal authority for making determinations of whether related
entities are separate. 54 Fed. Reg. 16042, 16045 (April 20, 1989). In the converse of Chevron, the
executive defers to the judiciary and allows the courts to select the corporate liability law that should be
applied in WARN Act cases.
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Supreme Court decisions limiting the use of federal common law and
common law analysis, show that separation of powers, federalism, and
institutional concerns have led the Court to limit the use of federal common
law and common law analysis. Therefore, it would be a mistake for parties
and lower federal courts to view Sosa as a general endorsement of the use of
federal common law. To the contrary, the Sosa majority's admonition that
lower federal courts must exercise restraint in recognizing new causes of
actionJustice Scalia's concurring opinion, and past Supreme Court decisions
eliminating use of common law analysis, constitute a warning that Sosa may
be a short-lived experiment if lower federal courts fail to exercise judicial
restraint.
Despite the Supreme Court's limitations upon the use of federal
common law, lower federal courts have accepted that federal common law,
and not state law, should be used to decide corporate liability issues in Title
VII actions, including successor liability and treatment of related corporations
as a single employer. In Title VII actions, parties commonly assume that
federal common law, and the substantial continuity test, should be used to
decide successor liability issues. Similarly, the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
and Eight Circuit Courts of Appeals accepted the view that federal common
law, not state law, should be used to decide successor liability issues in
CERCLA actions.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bestfoods raises serious
doubts about the view that federal common law should be used to decide
corporate liability issues in cases involving federal statutes, including the
Bankruptcy Code, False Claims Act, CERCLA and Title VII. Therefore, the
Supreme Court is very likely to favor use of state law to decide corporate
liability issues. Nevertheless, some parties and federal courts continue to
assume that federal law should determine the issues.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods and the post-Bes!foods
decisions of the First Circuit in Davis and the Ninth Circuit in Atchison, T.
& Santa Fe Ry., make it clear that state law, not federal law, should determine
successor liability issues in CERCLA cases. The Third, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions, which favor use of federal common law
in CERCLA actions, should be reevaluated to determine their validity. In
Bes~foods and other decisions, the Supreme Court rejected their premise that
common law analysis, and federal law, should be used to fill the interstices
of federal statutes.
In MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Brzozowski, and other decisions, the
courts of appeals also accepted the premise that common law analysis and
federal law should be used to fill the interstices of Title VII. Those decisions
cannot be considered good law in light of Bestfoods, and parties should not
assume that federal law controls questions of successor liability in Title VII
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cases. The continued validity ofMacMiUan Bloedel Containers, and other court
of appeals decisions following it, depends on whether courts can identify a
conflict between the policies of federal anti-discrimination statutes and state
common law rules concerning successor liability.
Similarly, it is a questionable practice for the courts of appeals to decide
Title VII parent-subsidiary liability issues by using common law analysis and
borrowing the integrated enterprise test or substantive consolidation test.
Nevertheless, courts of appeals other than the Seventh Circuit have
disregarded that court's conclusion that a Besfoods analysis should be used to
decide whether affiliated corporations should be treated as one employer. It
remains to be seen whether the courts of appeal in conflict with the Seventh
Circuit can justify under Besgfoods their use of the substantial continuity test
or other federal common law rules to determine corporate liability in Title
VII cases. There are reasons to doubt that the courts will be successful.

